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ACCESS ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH U.S.
MILITARY PRESENCE IN THAILAND AND THE
PHILIPPINES

by

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March 2005

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ABSTRACT

In pursuit of the objectives of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, the U.S. Armed Forces require access to military and logistics facilities overseas to be able to support and sustain its combat power projection. Access to these places translates into capabilities. Therefore, forward presence has a deterrent value even in a potential conflict scenario where the United States policy is one of “strategic ambiguity,” e.g., as in a Taiwan-PRC military confrontation. An American military forward presence in time of peace as well as in heightened regional tensions lends credibility to U.S. diplomacy. Moreover, access to forward locations is expedient when engaging transnational threats or supporting humanitarian missions, e.g., the South and Southeast Asia tsunami relief operations.

This thesis analyzes the political opposition to U.S. military presence in Thailand and the Philippines. The historical context that led to the development of this opposition is examined in detail to identify the domestic sources of disagreement with the United States military presence, or policies on access to base facilities. The rationale of those who oppose, as well as those who support, U.S. presence are clearly delineated. By understanding the sensitive political issues, American military planners and operators can adapt basing and access strategies according to the political climate in these two countries. The politics unique to each environment will dictate the combination of “pure” basing strategies tailored to meet the U.S. military objectives, as well as the public diplomacy required to support them.

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My gratitude to my wife, Evelyn, is unfathomable because of her unrelenting support and love throughout our years of friendship. I bow my head with respect and thanksgiving to my mother, Rosa, whose prayers sustained my endurance as a graduate student and officer in the United States Air Force.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. IMPORTANCE

In pursuit of the objectives of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, the U.S. Armed Forces require access to military and logistics facilities overseas to be able to support and sustain its combat power projection. Access to these places translates into capabilities. Therefore, forward presence has a deterrent value even in a potential conflict scenario where the United States policy is one of “strategic ambiguity,” e.g., as in a Taiwan-PRC military confrontation. An American military forward presence in time of peace or in a regional crisis lends credibility to U.S. diplomacy and may actually prevent armed hostilities. Moreover, access to forward locations is expedient when engaging transnational threats or supporting humanitarian missions, e.g., the tsunami relief operations.¹

Purpose:

This thesis analyzes the political opposition to the American military forward presence in Thailand and the Philippines as its dependent variable. It examines the historical context that led to the development of the opposition. The study focuses on the domestic sources (independent variable) of disagreement with the United States military presence, or policies on access to base facilities. For reasons of comparison, this study begins in the 1980s. This period presents an opportunity to compare the domestic opposition in Thailand after American bases closed in 1976 to that in the Philippines in which the U.S. military bases remained in the 1980s until their closure in 1992. The presence of American military bases in the past was perceived to have had an impact on domestic security and democracy. Security and democracy have an inverse relationship with the political opposition to American forward presence. If the U.S. military presence is perceived as contributing to security and democracy, there tends to be less opposition

¹ Admiral Thomas B. Fargo thanked the Thai government for allowing the U.S. military to use Utapao airbase in the country’s Chonburi province to support the regional tsunami relief efforts. Source: “US PACIFIC FORCES CHIEF APPLAUDS THAILAND FOR TSUNAMI OPERATIONS,” 20 January 2005, Thai Press Reports, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 01/31/05)

to an American military presence. Inversely, if the United States military access is perceived as compromising security² and democracy,³ the opposition becomes more assertive.

The presence of U.S. military bases in Thailand and the Philippines during the periods of military or authoritarian regimes shaped the perceptions that associated the American presence with the degradation of democracy. For the Filipinos, the legacy of American colonialism created nationalistic tendencies that view the continued presence of foreign military forces as inimical to national sovereignty. This perception was shared across the political spectrum in the 1980s, and not just on the political left.

In contrast, Thailand was not a colony of the United States and did not share the propensity for anti-American sentiments across a broad political spectrum. Instead, Thai national identity was shaped by the threats of incursion across the surrounding borders, either by imperialist and colonial powers in the 19th and 20th centuries like the British, French, and the Japanese or by communist forces from Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam during the height of the Cold War. Right-wing Thai nationalism focused on the nature of “Thainess” that placed emphasis on the “monarchy, religion, and the nation.”⁴ During the democratic transition of 1973, the political left in Thailand was viewed by the right-wing groups as composed of infiltrators and agitators linked to the external threat of

² According to P.H. Liotta, “Vital interests assure a state of its security, the defense of its freedom and independence, protection of its institutions, and enshrinement of its values.” Source: P.H. Liotta, “Still worth dying for national interests and the nature of strategy,” *Naval War College Review*, Spring 2003, from the internet: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_56/ai_101614291/pg_3 (accessed 01/11/05). Liotta cited Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Impasse of American Foreign Policy*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 191

³ Democracy as defined by Robert Dahl is a process of governing an association by having met at least five criteria: (1) effective participation, (2) voting equality, (3) opportunities for enlightened understanding, (4) final control of agenda, and (5) inclusive citizenship. Source: Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, Yale University Press (1998), 37, from the internet: http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Democracy/On_Democracy_Dahl.html (accessed 12/24/04)

⁴ Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World* (London and New York: Verso, 1998), 142. See Katherine A. Bowie, *Rituals of National Loyalty: An Anthropology of the State and the Village Scout Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 20. See also Marjorie A. Muecke, “The Village Scouts of Thailand,” *Asian Survey* 20, No.4 (April 1980), 422. These sources identified the counter-insurgency experts and the right-wing movement’s manipulation of nationalistic symbols that revolved around the monarchy, religion and the nation to challenge the iconoclasm of the Left. The insouciance of the young leftist students in questioning the traditional interpretation of Thai history was viewed by the rightists as a sign of disrespect towards the monarchy and religion.

communism.⁵ Hence, the leftist-organized anti-American (military bases) demonstrations were violently attacked by right-wing groups which included the *Nawaphon*, the Red Gaurs and the Village Scouts.⁶

The Village Scouts was a civilian organization formed by the Thai Border Police to counter the spread of communist influence in the rural areas.⁷ The Border Police had been an active component of the counter-insurgency program in the 1970s. The United States supported and financed the Thai Border Police in the early 1950s through the 1960s as part of the containment strategy against the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.⁸ Right-wing groups in Thailand viewed the United States as an ally against the threat of communism, especially in the 1970s at the height of the Vietnam War. Hence, the rightist movement advocated the continued presence of the American forces and military bases in Thailand during this period.⁹

The main points of criticism on democracy issues arose from the American support of the military regimes in Thailand and President Marcos' authoritarian regime in the Philippines. Other arguments against the American presence involve perceived threat to sovereignty and security. For these reasons, opponents of U.S. military access or deployment in Thailand and the Philippines will most likely attempt to perpetuate the perceptions or "myths" created as a result of the negative aspects of the past American presence. Charges of "neo-colonialism" are common in current discourse of the Philippine left, as they were in Thailand in the 1970s.

Thailand and the Philippines were recently designated by Washington as "major non-NATO allies." The U.S. military faces the possibility of future access or forward

⁵ Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1994), 169-170. He stated, "...one of the most persistent strategies of the counterinsurgency is to link socialists, communists, and the Left with the external threat." (170)

⁶ Bowie, 105-106

⁷ Ibid., 2-3

⁸ Daniel Fineman, *A special relationship: the United States and military government in Thailand, 1947-1958*, (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1997). See Bowie, 74-76. Beginning in 1965 and four years afterwards, 47 percent of all United States Operation Mission (USOM) aid to Thailand was given to the Thai National Police Department.

⁹ "At a demonstration by thirty thousand people on March 21, 1976, to demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Thailand grenades and plastic bombs were thrown into the crowd. Four people were killed and 85 injured. Red Gaurs [right-wing group of vigilantes] were seen in the area at the time of the bombing." Source: Bowie, 106. See David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, *Political Conflict in Thailand* (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), 167

deployments in these countries during a period of regional crisis. Furthermore, the United States military conducts regular training exercises with both countries. The potential impact of the American presence on the security and democracy in these countries will shape the debate about the issue of access in the years to come. The concepts of security and democracy will have different interpretations dictated by the competing interests of opposing groups within these countries. These groups may include left-wing and the right-wing nationalists, the Muslim minorities, and members of mainstream civil society and political parties.

Before dealing with the controversies of Thai and Philippine interests, it is best to first understand the need for American military forward access to overseas facilities. The U.S. rationale is rooted in national interests that are both implied and articulated by the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy.

B. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (NSS) AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY (NMS) OF THE UNITED STATES

“The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”¹⁰ Among the goals enunciated in the NSS are “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.”¹¹ The NSS laid down a list of tasks to achieve these goals. They include (1) championing the aspirations for human dignity, (2) strengthening of alliances to defeat global terrorism, (3) working with others to defuse regional conflicts, (4) the prevention of our enemies from threatening us and our allies with weapons of mass destruction, (5) promotion of global economic growth through free markets and free trade, (6) the expansion of open societies and democracies, (7) cooperative action with other main centers of global power, and (8) the transformation of America’s national security institutions.¹² The NSS established the overarching defense objectives that are supported by the 2004 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS in turn gives the strategic direction to the National Military Strategy (NMS). One

¹⁰ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 1

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 1-2

of the four NDS objectives that guide the NMS is, “Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.”¹³ The NMS stated its three supporting military objectives as follows: “to protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries.”¹⁴ The ability of the U.S. military to gain access to military and logistic facilities in Southeast Asia will facilitate the achievement of these NSS goals and NDS/NMS objectives.

America’s desire to build a consensus in the Asia-Pacific region against the scourge of terrorism involves a comprehensive approach to alliances. This alliance not only include traditional allies in Asia, but also the other major players in the region, viz., China and Russia, as evidenced by the counter-terrorism security measures endorsed by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in Chile recently.¹⁵

Free trade and the free market is one of the hallmarks of American policy in promoting global economic growth. China and Japan are among the top trade partners of the United States with 12.5 percent and 9.3 percent, respectively, of estimated total American imports in 2003.¹⁶ Japan is one of the major export partners of the United States with 7.2 percent of estimated total American exports in 2003.¹⁷ According to Eng Chuan Ong, “The Asia-Pacific region already accounts for almost 50 percent of world trade and for more than 50 percent of the world's economic output. East Asia accounts for approximately one-third of U.S. trade, broadly comparable to U.S. NAFTA partners, and exceeds Western Europe's share.”¹⁸ It is therefore in the national interest of the United States to maintain regional stability in Northeast and Southeast Asia. An American forward military presence and temporary deployment capabilities has a role in preventing conflicts and deterring aggression in the region.

¹³ The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004, 1

¹⁴ Ibid., 8. Bold in the original.

¹⁵ “APEC leaders pledge security boost,” CNN.com, posted 21 November 2004, from the internet: <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/11/21/apec.wrap.ap/index.html> (accessed 11/21/04)

¹⁶ CIA World Factbook, from the internet: <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html#Econ> (accessed 11/21/04)

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Eng Chuan Ong, “Anchor East Asian Free Trade in ASEAN,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 26.2 (2003), 57-72. From Project Muse: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v026/26.2ong.html (accessed 11/21/04)

Moreover, the operational concepts of the military's *Joint Vision 2020* include "dominant maneuver," "precision engagement," and "focused logistics."¹⁹ To employ these concepts, the U.S. Armed Forces will need access to overseas bases and facilities to mass its forces, deliver precision strikes against the opponent, and sustain these operations with logistics "at the right place and at the right time."²⁰ The recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq required the transport of equipment, personnel and supplies at long distances. Moving these forces from the Atlantic seaboard via the European bases to Southwest Asia was one of the mobility options. In addition, the availability of an alternate route from the Pacific west coast via Southeast Asia logistics facilities or "lily pads" could maximize the speed and the agility to mass American combat power. Access to forward logistics bases in Thailand and the Philippines will help project and sustain U.S. forces in the event of another Middle East crisis.

C. U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (USPACOM) THEATER SECURITY CONCERNS

In a speech to the Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies (APCSS) Biennial Conference on 16 June 2004, Admiral Thomas Fargo (Commander, USPACOM) identified the major regional security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region, as follows: (1) conflict in the Korean Peninsula, (2) miscalculation resulting in a conflict between India and Pakistan or in the Taiwan Straits, (3) Southeast Asia and transnational threats, including terrorism, piracy, illegal drug trade, trafficking in humans, and diseases like SARs, AIDS, and avian flu.²¹

The tensions resulting from the lull in the six-party talks involving South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, North Korea and the United States was viewed by the USPACOM commander with great concern. The North Koreans have about one million active-duty troops, six to seven million reservists, and chemical weapons according to Admiral Fargo.²² Admiral Fargo reiterated the importance of the peaceful solution to the

¹⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020*, June 2000, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office

²⁰ Ibid., 24

²¹ Thomas Fargo, speech given to the Asia-Pacific Center of Strategic Studies (APCSS), 16 June 2004, from the internet: <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040616apcss.shtml> (11/21/04)

²² Fargo, speech given to the Asia-Pacific Center, 16 June 2004

complete and permanent elimination of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula. A potential India-Pakistani conflict is similarly clouded by the prospect of a nuclear exchange. India and Pakistan came close to war because of increased tensions in 2002. A nuclear war in the Indian subcontinent would have unimaginable consequences in humanitarian terms.

Admiral Fargo was also concerned about a miscalculation in the Taiwan Straits and its destabilizing effect on the whole region. The United States adopted a policy supporting the peaceful solution of the Taiwan question that is free from the threat or use of armed force. President Bush reiterated the American opposition to a unilateral action by either party (China or Taiwan) to change the status quo across the Taiwan Straits. The United States supports a “one China” policy and the three communiqués.²³ In addition, the United States is also committed in fulfilling its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.²⁴ China has embarked on a program of military modernization that is altering the balance of forces across the Taiwan Straits. Even though the United States has chosen a military posture of “strategic ambiguity” in the case of a Taiwan crisis, it bodes well to have the capabilities to support whatever options America may adopt. One can be ambiguous in intent but also have a credible diplomatic weight by having the capability to project and sustain military power in the region. Access to forward locations and facilities in Thailand and the Philippines reinforces the hand of diplomacy.

Southeast Asia is also the location of the Straits of Malacca, an important oil route between the Middle East and Asia. The presence of transnational threats like terrorism, illegal drug trade, piracy, and epidemic diseases are a concern to the USPACOM because of their inimical effects on the stability of the region. The activities of the *Al-Qaeda*-linked *Jemaah Islamiyah* across Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines

²³ The three Joint Communiqués of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China were signed in 1972, 1979, and 1982 respectively. The 1972 document established normal relations between the two states. It was followed by the second communiqué establishing diplomatic relations in 1979. The 1982 joint communiqué reaffirmed the commitment of both countries to a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question. See Muthiah Alagappa, *Taiwan’s Presidential Politics: Democratization and Cross-Straits Relations in the Twenty-First Century* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), Appendix covering the three joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. See also U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs for posted e-copies of the Three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, from the internet: http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/east asia pacific/china/china_communiques.html (accessed 02/25/04)

²⁴ Ibid., See also Admiral Fargo, speech at the APCSS, 16 June 2004

highlighted the importance of these countries in the War on Terrorism. The spread of diseases like SARs, AIDS, and avian flu have deleterious consequences to the Southeast Asian economies because of the additional demands on their limited resources. The recent tsunami catastrophe in South and Southeast Asia demonstrated the critical importance of the ability to gain access to forward operating bases in Thailand.²⁵ Forward facilities and bases allows the United States not only to project combat capabilities, but also to conduct humanitarian missions and “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).

D. RAND “PURE” BASING STRATEGIES

This thesis focuses on the political issues inherent in the forward deployment of American military forces in Thailand and the Philippines. By understanding the political issues, U.S. military planners and operators can adapt the basing and access strategies according to the existing political milieu in these two countries. The politics unique to each environment will dictate the combination of “pure” basing strategies tailored to meet the U.S. military objectives and the public diplomacy required to support them.²⁶

The RAND Corporation undertook a study under the Project AIR FORCE that was sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations (AF/XO) that sought to “...examine the political, operational, logistical, and force protection issues associated with overseas basing for the Expeditionary Aerospace Force.”²⁷ The RAND report entitled *A Global Access Strategy for the U.S. Air Force* explores the “pure” basing and access strategies.²⁸ The study covered several issues and variables that may affect other countries’ decision to grant or deny access to the U.S. military. The RAND report distinguished three kinds of access, viz., (1) permanent presence, (2) mission presence,

²⁵ “Bush pledges U.S. assistance to tsunami survivors,” *Global News Wire*, 29 December 2004, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 01/02/05)

²⁶ The United States Information Agency defines Public Diplomacy as, “Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.” Source: Public Diplomacy Web Site, sponsored by the United States Information Agency Alumni Association, from the internet: <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm> (accessed 01/31/05)

²⁷ David A. Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga Oliker, and Tanya Charlick-Paley, *A Global Access Strategy for the U.S. Air Force*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), iii

²⁸ Shlapak and others, eds., *A Global Access Strategy*

and (3) limited access. “Permanent presence” is defined by the authors as, “The presence of U.S. forces abroad, in bases or facilities that are operated by the United States either alone or in concert with host countries...”²⁹ American bases in NATO countries, Japan, Korea, and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba are examples of this kind of basing arrangement.

“Mission presence” was described as substantial presence in countries for the purpose of an ongoing military mission where there may or may not be treaty commitments.³⁰

“Limited access” is the arrangement “...where the United States maintains no forces on a regular basis but where its troops visit on occasion to assist in training, for exercises, or to take part in contingency operations.”³¹ U.S. military presence in Thailand and the Philippines fits the description of “limited access.” Future access to bases in Thailand and the Philippines is not definite because of domestic political reasons and sensitivities to the presence of foreign troops. The purpose of the American military operations and its potential effect on the host nation’s relationship with third parties could affect the approval of access to base facilities. American humanitarian missions staged from these countries are less likely to be politicized. As a result, there may be minimal or no domestic political agitation against *MOOTW*, “Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations” (*NEO*), or humanitarian relief missions.

The RAND report identified five alternative “pure” basing strategies:

- (1) Expansion of the number of overseas main operating bases (MOBs) to increase the likelihood of military presence in these areas.
- (2) Identifying one or more “reliable” allies in each region of the world and relying on them for future cooperation.
- (3) Proliferation of security agreements and alliances to broaden potential partners in any given contingency.
- (4) Securing long-term extraterritorial access to bases, as in Diego Garcia.

²⁹ Shlapak and others, 16

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

- (5) Relying on extended-range operations from American territory, like Guam.³²

These basing or access strategies are reviewed at the end of this thesis after taking the political environment in Thailand and the Philippines into consideration. It is axiomatic that a modified or a combination of “pure” basing strategies may have to be adopted to fit the prevailing political and diplomatic climate.

E. OPPOSITION TO U.S. MILITARY FORWARD ACCESS IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND

This thesis’s major question asks, what are the sources of opposition to American military forward presence in Thailand and the Philippines? It also explores the rationales of the opposition and the historical context which incubated these rationales. This thesis relies on the empirical evidence from books, journals, newspaper and magazine articles to document opposition to past American military presence in Thailand and the Philippines and to determine the current issues related to the prevailing contraposition to base access and forward deployment in both countries.

As a result of this research, the thesis identifies the different sources and rationales of the opposition to the American military forward presence in Thailand and the Philippines. Although there were some minor issues (environmental pollution and prostitution) cited by the opposition, the major rationales can be summarized as follows:

- (1) Loss of sovereignty.
- (2) Constitutional restrictions regarding the presence of foreign military forces and bases.
- (3) Negative effects on civil-military relations.
- (4) Jurisdiction issues over incidents involving American personnel.
- (5) Potential involvement in American conflicts with third parties or neighboring states.
- (6) Past American support of authoritarian or military regimes.

³² Items 1-5 of the alternative “pure” basing strategies came from the RAND report, *A Global Access Strategy for the U.S. Air Force*. Source: Shlapak and others, 92-93.

- (7) Sensitivity of Muslim minorities to the American Global War on Terrorism that is perceived as anti-Islamic.
- (8) Government concern for the escalation of the Thai Muslim insurgency that may result from American forward deployments perceived to be related to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

The thesis shows the following reasons for supporting American military presence and access:

- (1) Defense against transnational and border threats, e.g., communist neighbors and international terrorism.
- (2) Improved internal defense against communist insurgencies and right-wing coups.³³
- (3) Treaty obligations, viz., mutual defense agreement.
- (4) Military assistance and training received from the United States.
- (5) Economic benefits corollary to American military presence, e.g., creation of jobs and economic development aid.
- (6) Humanitarian or non-combatant nature of American access, e.g., disaster relief, transit refueling of cargo aircraft, Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC).

Left-wing nationalist groups in the Philippines cited reasons (1) to (6), except (3), for opposing American military forward presence. Right-wing nationalist groups in the Philippines in the 1980s share rationales (1), (2), & (5) as the political left. Both Thai and Filipino Muslims voiced the sensitivities in point seven. Thai left-wing groups cited rationales (1), (3), (5), & (6). Members of the Thai academia, parliament, and the media share their government's concern regarding the eighth and last point. The six reasons for supporting U.S. military access or forward presence were cited by different groups and individuals in the government, the military, and the private sector in both Thailand and the Philippines.

³³ American F-4 PHANTOM jets flew missions from Clark Air Base as a symbol of support for the government of then President Corazon Aquino against the December 1989 attempted coup of right-wing forces within Philippine military. Source: "A close call for Aquino," *The Economist*, 9 December 1989, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/04/05)

F. ORGANIZATION

This thesis is organized as follows:

Chapter II reviews the colonial history of the Philippines under American rule and post-colonial nationalism and leftist mobilization in the 1960s-1970s. This chapter also looks at the role of the Thai military in politics, and the impact of the Cold War on the U.S. military forward presence in Thailand and the Philippines in the 1950s, 60s and 70s.

Chapter III delves into which groups are against the U.S. military presence and how they developed from the 1980s to the present period. In particular, three political camps are analyzed: leftist, right-wing, and the Muslim nationalist opposition.

Chapter IV explores the reasons why these groups are opposed to American military forward presence in Thailand and the Philippines.

Chapter V summarizes the conclusions regarding the major sources of opposition to U.S. military presence in Thailand and the Philippines. The designation of Thailand and the Philippines as major non-NATO allies (MNNA) reflects one of the “pure” basing strategies recommended by RAND. The MNNA label brought speculation in Thailand and the Philippines of possible re-establishment of American military bases in the future. These speculations are contrary to the USPACOM emphasis on “places, not bases” which resulted from the political sensitivity to the presence of American “permanent bases” in the past. In addition to RAND “pure” basing strategies (2) and (3) that fit the case of Thailand and the Philippines, the United States could expand non-military (civilian agencies, NGOs and law enforcement) relations to deal with counter-drugs, anti-piracy and counter-terrorism issues to avoid the sensitivities to a large American military footprint. It would be difficult to achieve specific security agreements in both Thailand and the Philippines to fit every conceivable, contingency scenario. Because of the controversial nature of American military presence and the inherent processes of debates or institutional checks and balances since the democratization in both Thailand and the Philippines, the Ad Hoc military deployments will remain dependant on the prevailing security interests of the potential host nation. Permanent military basing is definitely out of the question at the present time sans a change in the security threat perceptions of these countries in relation to the other major powers in the region.

II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF U.S.-PHILIPPINES AND U.S. -THAI RELATIONS³⁴

The left-wing and right-wing nationalists in the Philippines criticized the American military presence and access to base facilities in their territory because it was a symbol of the colonial legacy and highlighted the “neocolonial”³⁵ status of the Philippine relationship with the United States. There are a variety of left-wing nationalist groups in the Philippines which include the communist-led National Democratic Front and the “reaffirmists” (pro-Sison) faction of the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on the far left, the “rejectionist” faction of the CPP which had splintered into numerous Marxist-Leninist parties and groups, the non-communist left composed of the social democrats and popular democrats, and independent center-left politicians who may belong to diverse political parties. The right-wing movement in the Philippines remains latent in recent years, but it had been active politically in the 1980s in campaigning against the American military bases.³⁶ Members of the Young Officers Union (YOU) were considered the most radical nationalist faction of these right-wing groups, which include the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and the Marcos-loyalists’

³⁴ The history of the United States relationship with Thailand and the Philippines had shaped the attitudes and outlook of left-wing and right-wing nationalists towards the American military forward presence in both countries. Although the American colonial policies in the Philippines may have affected the development of Moro nationalism, the negative reaction of Filipino Muslims to American military presence has more to do with current United States policies related to the Middle East and the War on Terrorism. Furthermore, the historical experience of Filipino Muslims with American colonial rule was not totally negative because Mindanao’s autonomy was preserved as it was administered separately by the U.S. Army from the rest of the Philippines through the cooptation of the Moro elites (Abinales, 3-6). Abinales explored the rationale of local Muslim politicians who supported the American military presence on Basilan to assist the AFP in the suppression of the Abu Sayyaf. Source: Patricio Abinales, “American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Review,” *East-West Center Politics and Security Series*, no. 7 (October 2004), from the internet: <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/PSwp007.pdf> (accessed 02/12/05), 13-14

The attitude of Muslims in southern Thailand was affected by current American policies in the Middle East and Prime Minister Thaksin’s decision to send Thai soldiers to Iraq in support of the post-conflict American occupation.

³⁵ According to Chalmers Johnson, “The characteristic institution of so-called neocolonialism is the multinational corporation covertly supported by an imperialist power. This form of imperialism reduces the political costs and liabilities of colonialism by maintaining a façade of nominal political independence in the exploited country.” Source: Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 30

³⁶ Jose V. Abueva, comp., *Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy*, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, (Manila: Recon Printing Press, 1990)

Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP).³⁷ The RAM changed its name in the early 1990s to *Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabayan* (RAM) or Revolutionary Nationalist Alliance. Anti-American nationalism in the Philippines is certainly not the purview solely of the political left. Although the rightists' movement is politically latent, certain quarters in the Armed Forces of the Philippines occasionally echo the right-wing nationalists' resentment of American military presence - especially the involvement of American Special Forces personnel in the recent counter-terrorism exercises in the southern Philippines.³⁸

While Thailand was never a colony of the United States, the large presence of U.S. armed forces in the 1970s was interpreted by the political left during those times as a violation of the sovereignty of the country.³⁹ The withdrawal of the American bases from Thailand was one of the top campaign issues of the leading left-wing student organization, the National Student Center of Thailand, during the short period of democratic space between 1973 and 1976.⁴⁰ In addition to the left-wing movement in academia, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) used political, economic, cultural and military themes linked to the American presence to spread the claim of American colonialism or neocolonialism in Thailand.⁴¹

³⁷ Abueva, *Kudeta*, 133-137

³⁸ "Maj. Gen. Raul Relano, commanding general of the [Philippine] Army's 6th ID, admitted that some of his officers have raised the issue of "sovereignty" over the Americans' presence. At one point, Relano said, some officers confronted the Americans themselves about whether they had "written" authority to stay in camp, only to be told in vague terms they got their clearance to stay in 6th ID from Camp Aguinaldo, the main headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)." Source: Aries Rufo, "Unwanted Presence?" Newsbreak online edition (February 2005), from the internet: http://partners.inq7.net/newsbreak/istories/index.php?story_id=21716 (accessed 02/03/05)

³⁹ "The post-October 14 [1973] civilian governments were apparently unable to resist the increasingly strong pressure for the U.S. withdrawal. For example, *Siang Puang Chon* (Voice of the People), urged the Seni government that the U.S. presence meant the loss of Thailand's sovereignty and honor as well as future damage to the country and its neighbors... The daily went on to encourage the NTSC to carry on their fight against the presence of U.S. bases in Thailand." Source: Puangthong Rungwasdisab, "Thailand's Response to the Cambodian Genocide," Genocides Studies Program, Yale University, from the internet: <http://www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/ThailandResponse.html> (accessed 02/03/05)

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Stephen I. Alpern, "Insurgency in the Northeast of Thailand: A New Cause for Alarm," *Asian Survey* 15, no. 8 (1975), 687. According to Chalmers Johnson, "...neocolonial domination need not be economic. It can be based on a kind of international protection racket - mutual defense treaties, military advisory groups, and military forces stationed in foreign countries to 'defend' against often poorly defined, overblown, or nonexistent threats." Source: Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire*, 31

Understanding the history of Philippine-American and Thai-American relations will clarify the sources of the perceptions that shape the opposition to American military presence in these countries.

A. AMERICAN COLONIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE POST-INDEPENDENCE “SPECIAL” PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

Perhaps it is ironic, from the perspective of present-day Filipino opposition to the U.S. military forward presence, that the American quest for a colony in Asia in the late 19th century was spurred by a desire to have access to a strategic military and commercial post to establish trade with mainland China and the rest of Asia. The Philippines is at the crossroads of commerce and navigation that linked Northeast and Southeast Asia. America’s declaration of war against Spain in 1898 was fortuitous in a historical sense because the latter was the colonial power occupying the Philippine Islands at that time. As the confluence of events turned out, the United States was also an emerging industrial and military power in search of a role in the international system dominated by the imperialist and colonial powers like England and France. For the American supporters of the war with Spain, nothing was more convenient than to have a “splendid little war” to depose the floundering Spanish stranglehold over colonies in the Caribbean and the Asia-Pacific. The most influential American anti-imperialist, Mark Twain, supported the Spanish-American war in the belief that it was for the purpose of freeing the colonies from Spanish oppression.⁴² Mark Twain was appalled to learn the contents of the Treaty of Paris, which gave the United States control of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines.⁴³ Spain received twenty million dollars from America in exchange for the Philippines.⁴⁴ The United States had arrived at the international arena of great power

⁴² Mark Twain, *Mark Twain’s Weapons of Satire: Anti-Imperialist Writings on the Philippine-American War*, ed. Jim Zwick (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), xix-xx

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Library of Congress, “Treaty of Paris 1898,” (8/14/98), from the internet: <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/treaty.html> (accessed 02/03/05)

politics urged by the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan's sea power doctrine and President William McKinley's "Manifest Destiny."⁴⁵

Before the United States entered the scene in 1898, the Philippines crossed the Rubicon of self-determination after more than three hundred years under the colonial rule of Spain. Filipinos rose in revolt against Spain in 1896 after the frustration with the earlier attempts of the Philippine Reform Movement to gain gradual political changes and representation in the Spanish Cortez.⁴⁶ The first phase of the Philippine revolution spread from the outskirts of Manila across the island of Luzon after the secret society of the *Katipunan* was discovered by the Spanish authorities.⁴⁷ According to Filipino historian Teodoro Agoncillo, "... before the outbreak of the revolution, the *Katipunan* in Cavite was already divided into two factions representing two provincial councils."⁴⁸ The two camps were known as the *Magdalo* and the *Magdiwang* factions. The rivalry of these groups led to a series of reversals in the revolution's progress in the province of Cavite in early January 1897.⁴⁹ Leaders of the *Magdiwang* faction invited the leader of the *Katipunan*, Andres Bonifacio, to mediate between the two camps to resolve the disputes. The *Magdalo* faction argued that since the revolution had already broken out

⁴⁵ Alfred Thayer Mahan is a U.S. naval officer and historian well-known for his written work *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (published 1890) whose main thesis stated that a nation which controlled the sea lanes of commerce hold the decisive factor in modern warfare. From the internet: <http://www.bartleby.com/65/ma/Mahan-A1.html> (accessed 01/14/05). President William McKinley articulated the ideas of "Manifest Destiny" to rationalize the annexation of the Philippines as a colony. "Manifest Destiny" was the phrase used by American politicians in the 1840s to justify the continental expansion of the United States. It gained religious and political overtones in later years by invoking the "mission" to spread the ideals of democracy, freedom and faith to rationalize imperialist expansion in the Philippines and the Caribbean. From the internet: <http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/E/manifest/manifxx.ht> (accessed 01/14/05)

⁴⁶ There were several organizations that sought political reforms in the Philippine colony and in Spain. One of these is the Hispano-Filipino Association which among other things submitted a petition to the Spanish Cortes (parliament) to seek parliamentary representation for the Philippines. The petition was ignored by the Cortes. The association secured the passage of the compulsory teaching of Spanish and other laws related to judiciary reforms. These reforms were never carried out after the reactionary group returned to power in Spain. The other groups which played a role in the quest for reforms were the *La Liga Filipina* and members of the Masonic lodges in both Spain and the Philippines. Both organizations supported the Propaganda Movement via the publication of *La Solidaridad* (The Solidarity). Although the Masons were not directly responsible for the revolution, Andres Bonifacio, the founder of the revolutionary underground *Katipunan*, was a member of a Masonic lodge. Source: Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *History of the Filipino People* (Quezon City: Garotech Publishing, 1990), 142-148

⁴⁷ Ibid., 170

⁴⁸ Ibid., 175

⁴⁹ Ibid, 176 See also Apolinario Mabini, "First Stage of the Revolution," *The Philippine Revolution*, trans. Leon Ma. Guerrero (Philippines: National Historical Commission, 1969), from the internet: <http://www.univie.ac.at/Voelkerkunde/apsis/aufi/history/mabini2.htm> (accessed 02/06/05)

and the *Katipunan* was no longer a secret society, the organization ought to be superseded by a new government. Members of the *Magdiwang* faction “contended that the Katipunan should remain the government of the revolutionists because it already had a constitution and by-laws recognized by all.”⁵⁰ Andres Bonifacio acceded to the demands of the *Magdalo* faction to reach a compromise. Both groups agreed to meet and the *Katipunan* held an election at the Tejeros Convention in March 1897.⁵¹ The Tejeros elections did not end the factionalism within the *Katipunan*:

At a convention held at Tejeros, the Katipunan's headquarters in March 1897, delegates elected Aguinaldo president and demoted Bonifacio to the post of director of the interior. Bonifacio withdrew with his supporters and formed his own government. After fighting broke out between Bonifacio's and Aguinaldo's troops, Bonifacio was arrested, tried, and on May 10, 1897, executed by order of Aguinaldo.⁵²

The revolutionaries were demoralized by the execution of Bonifacio and suffered reverses during the rest of 1897, but the Spaniards also recognized the difficulties of completely defeating the insurgents in the battlefield. The contending parties had reached a strategic stalemate and started armistice negotiations in August 1897.⁵³ Through intermediaries, the Spanish governor reached an agreement whereby he would pay Aguinaldo a sum equivalent to \$800,000 if he and his government moved to Hong Kong in exile.⁵⁴ This agreement would buy time for the Spanish governor to consolidate control of the colony. For Aguinaldo and the revolutionary government, the money gained from the agreement would be used to purchase weapons and ammunition to continue the revolution. Kratoska and Batson described the armistice, “This extraordinary agreement reveals the weakness of the Filipino forces, constantly harassed by the Spanish and unable to attract the backing of the landed Filipino elite, the *principalia* [class], whose wealth and control of manpower would have appreciably

⁵⁰Agoncillo, 177. Andres Bonifacio was the founder and the recognized leader of the *Katipunan*.

⁵¹ Mabini, Chapter VIII

⁵² Library of Congress Country Studies, “The 1896 Uprising and Rizal’s Execution,” Philippines – Country Study, from the internet: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+ph0022\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ph0022)) (accessed 02/06/05)

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid. See also Paul Kratoska and Ben Batson, “Nationalism and Modernist Reform,” *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, Volume Three, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 256

strengthened the revolutionary cause.”⁵⁵ The revolution went into a hiatus after General Emilio Aguinaldo signed the truce with the Spanish authorities in 1897. He went into exile in Hong Kong on 27 December 1897.⁵⁶

Tensions between the United States and Spain arose after suspicions that the latter sabotaged the American ship, the USS *Maine*, which exploded while moored at the port of Havana, Cuba on 15 February 1898.⁵⁷ Prior to this incident, there was already increasing Spanish uneasiness with the Republican League’s vote for the U.S. recognition of the Cuban insurgents who were fighting for independence from Spain.⁵⁸

When the United States declared war on Spain on 25 April 1898, the motion was set for the American support of the Filipino revolution against the Spanish colonial rule. Aguinaldo was transported back to the Philippines on an American steamer and he disembarked in Cavite province on 19 May.⁵⁹ Admiral Dewey of the U.S. Navy provided 100 rifles to Aguinaldo and the American Consul in Hong Kong purchased another 2,000 rifles for the Philippine independence movement.⁶⁰ Upon his arrival in the Philippines, General Aguinaldo consolidated his power and declared the Philippine independence on 12 June 1898.⁶¹ His pronouncement was modeled after the American declaration of independence.⁶² By June of 1898, the Filipino revolutionaries had virtual control of the whole island of Luzon with the exception of the port of Cavite and the city of Manila.⁶³ On 23 June, Aguinaldo announced the formation of the Revolutionary Government, composed of an executive, congress and judiciary courts.⁶⁴ A revolutionary congress was convened at Malolos (thirty-two kilometers north of Manila) on 15

⁵⁵ Kratoska and Batson, 256

⁵⁶ Agoncillo, 185

⁵⁷ Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989), 95

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 21

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Library of Congress Country Studies, “The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty of Paris,” Philippines – Country Study, from the internet: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+ph0024\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ph0024)) (accessed 01/22/05)

⁶³ Agoncillo, 193

⁶⁴ Linn, 21

September 1898 for the purpose of drawing up a constitution for the new republic.⁶⁵ The document was approved by the congress on 29 November 1898 and it was promulgated on 21 January 1899.⁶⁶ Emilio Aguinaldo was proclaimed president of the republic two days after the promulgation of the constitution which was modeled after the constitutions of France, Belgium and the Latin American countries.⁶⁷ According to Library of Congress researchers, the period of the first Philippine Republic was described as follows:

American observers traveling in Luzon commented that the areas controlled by the republic seemed peaceful and well governed. The Malolos congress had set up schools, a military academy, and the Literary University of the Philippines. Government finances were organized, and new currency was issued. The army and navy were established on a regular basis, having regional commands. The accomplishments of the Filipino government, however, counted for little in the eyes of the great powers as the transfer of the islands from Spanish to United States rule was arranged in the closing months of 1898.⁶⁸

The colonization of the Philippines was justified by President McKinley under the rubric of the “manifest destiny.”⁶⁹ President McKinley stated in one of his interviews regarding the colonization of the Philippines, “...that we could not leave them [Filipinos] to themselves – they were unfit for self-government – and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was.”⁷⁰

The American annexation of the Philippines under the Treaty of Paris after the existence of a duly constituted Philippine state elicited anger from the Filipinos. A revolutionary Filipino general Antonio Luna quipped, “people are not to be bought and sold like horses and houses. If the aim [of the American Civil War] has been to abolish

⁶⁵ Library of Congress, “The Malolos Constitution”

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Agoncillo, 206-209. According to Agoncillo, “Owing to the objections of Mabini [Aguinaldo’s adviser] to some provisions of the constitution, Aguinaldo did not immediately promulgate it.” See also Apolinario Mabini, “Development of the Revolution,” *The Philippine Revolution*, Chapter IX

⁶⁸ Library of Congress Country Studies, “The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty of Paris”

⁶⁹ Library of Congress, “The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty of Paris” See footnote 14 for description of “Manifest Destiny”

⁷⁰ General James Rusling, “Interview with President William McKinley,” *The Christian Advocate* [New York], January 22, 1903, 17. Cited from Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, eds., *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship and Resistance* (Boston: South End Press, 1987), 22

the traffic in Negroes because it meant the sale of persons, why is there still maintained the sale of countries with inhabitants?"⁷¹

The Philippine War erupted because of the tensions arising out of the United States decision to remain in the Philippines. Actual hostilities broke out on 4 February 1899 after two American soldiers on patrol killed three Filipino soldiers at the San Juan Bridge located outside Manila.⁷² The conflict that followed was the first American insurgency war in Asia. It involved a total of 126,000 American soldiers with 4,234 killed in action.⁷³ Approximately 16,000 Filipino soldiers died during this war which lasted from 1899 to 1902.⁷⁴ "According to historian Gregorio Zaide, as many as 200,000 civilians died, largely because of famine and disease, by the end of the war."⁷⁵

Filipino critics point out that America's entry into world power politics in the late 19th century was clothed with the ideals of freedom and liberty that bore a resemblance to the goals of the current American policy in pursuit of "democratic peace."⁷⁶ Comparing the 1898 Spanish-American War in the Philippines to the current war in Iraq, Filipino critic Alexander Martin Remollino stated:

As is now [sic] the case with the war on Iraq, the war in the Philippines was premised on "regime change." The war in the Philippines purportedly aimed to oust the Spanish colonial rulers and "liberate" its inhabitants; the war on Iraq, among other things, supposedly aims to oust its leader Saddam Hussein in a quest to "liberate" the Iraqi people from decades of tyranny...The [Spanish-American] war ended with American colonial rule over the Philippines – the result of a war which promised liberation for the Filipino people [from Spanish colonialism].⁷⁷

⁷¹ Library of Congress, "The Malolos Constitution and the Treaty of Paris"

⁷² Library of Congress, "War of Resistance," Philippines – Country Study, from the internet: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+ph0025\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ph0025)) (accessed 01/22/05)

See Linn, 42-46; and Agoncillo, 217

⁷³ Ibid., Library of Congress, "War of Resistance"

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid; see Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother* (London: Longman, 1960); and Russell Roth, *Muddy Glory: America's "Indian Wars" in the Philippines, 1899-1935* (West Hanover, MA: Christopher, 1981)

⁷⁶ Alexander Martin Remollino, "The Iraq-Pinaglabanan Parallel," *Bulatlat* 3 (March-April 2003), from the internet: <http://www.bulatlat.org/news/3-9/3-9-pinaglabanan.html> (accessed 02/02/05)

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Political groups that oppose American military forward presence in the Philippines were not disinclined to cite this historical fact. The precedents of the 19th century history served to bolster the criticisms of current American foreign policy.

The detractors from the political left often cite the laws enacted during the colonial rule in addition to the “unequal treaties”⁷⁸ signed with the United States after independence as the baseline sources of the economic and political ills that beset Philippine growth and development. For example, Jose Maria Sison (founder of the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines) lambasted the Payne-Aldrich Act of 1909 for perpetuating a colonial and agrarian economy.⁷⁹ Under this law, American finished goods were imported into the Philippines free of tariff, and the quota limitations of raw materials exported to the United States was lifted in 1913.⁸⁰ According to Sison, “The increasing avalanche of finished goods into the country crushed local handicrafts and manufacturers and furthermore compelled the people to buy these finished goods and to produce raw materials mainly.”⁸¹

The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 provided for the adoption of the 1935 Philippine constitution and the commonwealth government with a provision for the eventual independence ten years after the ratification of the constitution.⁸² Sison criticized the contents of this law, as follows:

The law made sure that among so many imperialist privileges, U.S. citizens and corporations would retain their property rights in the Philippines, that the U.S. government would be able to station its troops and occupy large areas of Philippine territory as its military bases and that

⁷⁸ “Unequal treaties” were a series of treaties between the United States and the Philippines which gave the former “...arrangements reflecting the undiminished control of the Philippines” (Jose Maria Sison). These treaties include the U.S.-R.P. Military Bases Agreement of 1947, the Laurel-Langley Agreement, and other agreements listed by Sison. Cited from Amado Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution (PSR)*, 30 January 1970, from the internet: <http://www.geocities.com/kabataangmakabayan64/psr.pdf> (02/27/05), 42. Amado Guerrero was the nom de guerre of Jose Maria Sison, founder of the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). He was the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPP at the time when the PSR was published in 1970.

⁷⁹ Ibid. Jose Maria Sison was also the founder of the *Kabataang Makabayan* (Patriotic Youth) in 1964. The reaffirmist faction of the CPP retained control of the New People’s Army and the National Democratic Front (“united front” political arm of the CPP). These groups are vehemently opposed to any – permanent or temporary – American access to base facilities in the Philippines.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, 14

⁸² The Philippine Independence Act (Tydings-McDuffie Act), from the internet: <http://www.chanrobles.com/tydingsmcduffieact.htm> (accessed 01/22/05)

the United States and the Philippines would maintain free trade...U.S. imperialism rigged up the Constitutional Convention of 1935. Delegates came overwhelmingly from the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class.⁸³

The Philippines was briefly occupied by Japan from 1941 to 1945 before it received its independence from the United States on 4 July 1946. Critics from the left cited the “unequal treaties” signed by the Philippines and the United States as a manifestation of the “neocolonial” relationship.⁸⁴ The series of treaties signed with the United States considered by Filipino nationalists as detrimental to Philippine national independence include the Bell Trade Act (amended by the Laurel-Langley Agreement in 1954), the U.S.-R.P. Military Bases Agreement of 1947, and others. The Bell Trade Act was linked to the “parity amendment” of the Philippine constitution, which gave Americans equal or parity rights to dispose, develop, exploit, and utilize “all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands” of the Philippines.⁸⁵ The agreement encompassed the right of Americans to operate public utilities and exploitation of water, coal, petroleum, and mineral resources of the Philippines.⁸⁶ “Payment of war damages amounting to US\$620 million, as stipulated in the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, was made contingent [by the U.S. Congress] on the Philippine acceptance of the parity clause.”⁸⁷

The Military Bases Agreement of 1947 gave the United States *de facto* control of twenty-three military bases and facilities on Philippine territory, including Clark Air Base and the facilities at Subic Bay Naval Base.⁸⁸ Continued American control of Philippine territories without the mechanism of direct colonial rule represented the cornerstone of the neo-colonial relationship.⁸⁹ The Military Assistance Agreement was also signed in 1947 and provided for the establishment of the Joint United States Military Advisory

⁸³ Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, 17

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Agoncillo, 433

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Library of Congress Country Studies, “Economic Relations with the United States after Independence,” Philippines – Country Study, from the internet: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+ph0035\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ph0035)) (accessed 01/22/05)

⁸⁸ Library of Congress Country Studies, “Security Agreements,” Philippines – Country Study, from the internet: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+ph0036\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ph0036)) (accessed 01/22/03)

⁸⁹ See footnote 8 and 9

Group to advise and train the Philippine armed forces and to authorize the transfer of equipment and material.⁹⁰ Jose Maria Sison criticized these military agreements in his book, *Philippine Society and Revolution*,⁹¹ as follows:

The U.S.-R.P. Military Bases Agreement, 1947. Under this agreement, U.S. imperialism retains its control over the entire Philippine territory. The Filipino people are literally in a large prison surrounded by strategically located U.S. land, air and naval bases.⁹²

The U.S.-R.P. Military Assistance Pact, 1947. This unequal treaty further ensures U.S. imperialist control over the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Through the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), U.S. imperialism extends strategic and staff direction, logistics, training and intelligence coordination to the reactionary Armed Forces of the Philippines. U.S. military advisers exercise direct control over the A.F.P.⁹³

The Philippines received military assistance from the United States to stem the threat of the communist *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan* (HMB) or National Liberation Army, popularly known as *Huks* in the 1950s.⁹⁴ The JUSMAG provided an estimated total of \$200 million to the AFP in the early 1950s.⁹⁵ According to historian Benedict Kerkvliet, the rebellion was primarily driven by tenant-landlord conflicts and not by

⁹⁰ Library of Congress, "Security Agreements"

⁹¹ *Philippine Society and Revolution* laid down the basic doctrine of the "national democratic" Left and the party line of the CPP. It is the source document of the study materials used in the CPP-NDF-NPA indoctrination. Patricio N. Abinales described the book as the "so-called 'Bible of the Revolution.'" See Patricio N. Abinales, "Asia's Last People's War: The Communist Insurgency in Post-Marcos Philippines," (Kyoto: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, no date), 3

⁹² Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, 43

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ The *Huk* rebellion was a peasant revolt that developed in the provinces of Central Luzon between 1946 through the early 1950s. According to Kerkvliet, the "vast majority of people [in Central Luzon] were share tenants ...they work the land that someone else owned and divided the harvest with the landowner on a percentage basis." There was more to this relationship than economics because the social ties that bind landlord and tenants were also the basis of a patron-client relationship. Under this relationship, the tenant can rely on the landlord for support during time of need, e.g., the tenants received rations from the landlord to guarantee that their families have food when the harvest is unpredictable. The modernization that began during the American colonial period and the introduction of capitalism created the conditions that altered the social ties that bind this relationship. The tenants could no longer rely on the landlords to provide the social safety-net that was inherent in the old patron-client relationship. The tenants' grievances escalated into an open revolt and found expression through the HMB movement. Benedict J Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 5, 7, 25 and 157

⁹⁵ William Blum, *The CIA: a forgotten history* (London: Zed Books, 1986), 40

communist ideology.⁹⁶ Violent agrarian unrest in the Philippines had a long tradition that date back several centuries.⁹⁷ The Philippine government often sided with the landlords in these land disputes.⁹⁸ By supporting the Philippine military against the peasant rebellion, the United States may have been perceived as perpetuating the feudal or semi-feudal relationships between the landlords and peasants in some parts of the Philippines. Given that the Bell Trade Act and later the Laurel-Langley Agreement fostered the economic viability of raw material commodity exports (e.g., sugar) to the United States, it reinforced the rent-seeking behavior of the big land-owners that were involved in these landlord-peasant conflicts.

Even though the primary reason for the American support of the Philippine counter-insurgency program against the Huks was ideological, PKP/HMB propaganda attempted to portray it differently to the peasants and workers in the Philippines.⁹⁹ The ideological component of the United States position during the Cold War was well articulated in NSC 68 (United States Objectives and Programs for National Security), which spelled out the conflict of ideas and values between America and the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁰ There was also a fundamental American interest in suppressing the *Huk* rebellion that is rooted in the need to secure the American military bases in the Philippines that could have been threatened by a communist take-over of the Philippine

⁹⁶ Library of Congress Country Studies, "The Huk Rebellion," Philippines – Country Study, from the internet: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+ph0037\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ph0037)) (accessed 01/22/05) See also Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion*

⁹⁷ Larry E. Cable, *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 44

⁹⁸ Library of Congress, "The Huk Rebellion"

⁹⁹ According to Kerkvliet, "The issues of imperialism and nationalism alone were not salient for them [villagers in Central Luzon]." Source: Kerkvliet, 174. PKP propagandist recognized the difficulties in portraying the United States as an "imperialist" because Americans were viewed by many as liberators from the Japanese occupation. Source: Kerkvliet, 228. The concept of "imperialism" is so abstract to most peasants and workers that an instructor of PKP schools stated, "It is hard to make peasants see the connection between their problems and American imperialism." Source: Kerkvliet, 228

¹⁰⁰ National Security Council, NSC 68: *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, 14 April 1950, from the internet: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm> (accessed 01/23/05)

state.¹⁰¹ The loss of the American military bases at Clark and Subic would have dealt a serious blow to the strategic position of the United States in Asia at the period of the escalating Cold War.

American support against the communist insurgency in the Philippines was perceived and portrayed by its critics as a direct intervention to secure the sources of raw materials for the United States commodities market.¹⁰² The timing of the trade treaties (1953 Agreement Relating to Entry of U.S. Traders and the 1954 Laurel-Langley Agreement) in proximity of the mutual defense and military assistance pacts made them suspect in the eyes of Filipino left-wing nationalists. Current discourses against the American military forward presence in the Philippines reflect a similar interpretation. For example, the recent press release of the CPP stated, “CPP sees link between mining and US [sic] troop deployments.”¹⁰³ Criticisms about resources exploitation were common in the past arguments of the pro-Moscow Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its successor, the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Sison characterized the Laurel-Langley Agreement as follows:

This new treaty aggravated the economic subservience of the Philippines to U.S. imperialism by allowing the U.S. monopolies to enjoy parity rights in all kinds of businesses. Adjustments in the quota system and preferential treatment for Philippine raw materials were made only to deepen the colonial and agrarian character of the economy.¹⁰⁴

As a result of the preferential treatment given by the United States to commodity materials produced in the Philippines, a lucrative market arose for the agricultural sector

¹⁰¹ National Security Council, *A Report to the President by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with respect to the Philippines*, 9 November 1950, Digital National Security Archive, from the internet: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/cgi-bin/cqcggi?CQ_SESSION_KEY=XJJKGOPYWATO&CQ_DTF_CAT_ITEMS=1&CQDOC=34&CQ_QUERY_HANDLE=140490

¹⁰² “In 1951, the Quirino puppet regime had the U.S.-R.P. Mutual Defense Treaty ratified, allowing the United States to intervene arbitrarily in Philippine affairs under the pretext of mutual protection. In 1953, Quirino signed the agreement extending indefinitely the effectivity [sic] of the U.S.-R.P. Military Assistance Pact which was first signed in 1947. Also in 1953 the Agreement Relating to Entry of U.S. Traders and investors was signed, facilitating the entry of U.S. capital and managerial personnel into the Philippines.” Source: Jose Maria Sison, *Philippine Society and Revolution*

¹⁰³ “There is a close link between the Arroyo regime's all-out campaign to lure foreign mining companies to plunder Philippine mineral resources and the escalation of US military intervention.” Source: Communist Party of the Philippines, Press Release 8 February 2005, from the internet: <http://www.philippinerevolution.org/cgi-bin/statements/releases.pl?date=050208a;refer=kr;language=eng> (accessed 02/08/05)

¹⁰⁴ Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, 26

that primarily benefited the large land-owners and the agricultural based industries like sugar-mills and refineries. It essentially reduced the economic incentives to invest in other industries (like manufacturing) that could have stimulated the growth of a vigorous and independent bourgeoisie as a requisite of democracy. Barrington Moore identified the industrial and the commercial middle classes as the main social forces in the modern era that is favorable to democracy.¹⁰⁵ Although the colonial (under the United States) and the post-colonial Philippine economy underwent a limited form of capitalist development, it did not create the accelerated conditions ripe for the industrial and commercial take-off that could have significantly produced a large market for “free” labor or a dominant, revolutionary and vibrant bourgeoisie. The conditions of post-independence Philippine politics were influenced heavily by the political economy dominated by the land-owning oligarchy that had benefited from the colonial policies previously noted (Payne-Aldrich Act) and the post-colonial treaties like the Bell Trade Act and the Laurel-Langley Agreement.¹⁰⁶ The Philippine state was basically captured by the landed interests in what Benedict Anderson called “cacique democracy” or what Damien Kingsbury termed “oligarchic democracy.”¹⁰⁷ While democratic institutions and processes (elections) were in place in the Philippines since independence from the United States, the competing economic elites had the financial resources to build and run the effective political machineries necessary to capture the state. The overwhelming representations of the oligarchic elites in the legislative and the executive branches as well as in key positions of the bureaucracy meant that their interests were well represented and the state remained less responsive to the demands of the subaltern classes.

As part of the Cold War containment strategy, the United States became involved in the Vietnam War. The military facilities in the Philippines played an important

¹⁰⁵ Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); see *Democratization*, ed. David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh, and Paul Lewis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 19-22. Barrington Moore said, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy.” Moore identified the aristocracy as the class that has the most anti-democratic outlook. An agrarian social structure dominated by an aristocracy dependent on cheap farm labor have no interest in giving the peasant class and farm labor a representative voice in the state.

¹⁰⁶ Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World* (London: Verso, 1998), 193-226; See Damien Kingsbury, *Southeast Asia: A Political Profile* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 299-324

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

supporting role as a logistics base and as a safe location for rest and recreation. Because of the increased presence of American troops in the Philippines, the incidents involving local residents and U.S. service members became more pronounced. The issue of jurisdiction over criminal cases involving Americans was contested by Filipino nationalists who saw the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as granting extraterritorial rights that compromised national sovereignty.¹⁰⁸ The current opposition to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) often cited the jurisdiction issue.¹⁰⁹

The escalation of the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s also stirred memories of the Philippine War and inspired a renewed nationalism among the Filipino youth. A revival of nationalist groups among academics and students started with the goal not only to protest against the war in Vietnam, but also to demand the ouster of the American military bases in the Philippines. President Lyndon Johnson's attendance at the Manila Summit in 1964 was greeted by "no less than 3,000 students and members of the nationalistic *Kabataang Makabayan*."¹¹⁰ The militant *Kabataang Makabayan* (KM) was formally organized by Jose Maria Sison on 30 November 1964.¹¹¹ According to Sison, from its inception the KM "...was committed to arouse, organize and mobilize the youth from the toiling masses of workers and peasants and the middle social strata for the revolutionary struggle for national liberation and democracy."¹¹² During the early years of the KM, controversy erupted over whether the organization was a purely nationalist organization or was organized by Sison at the behest of the PKP leadership.¹¹³

During his second term in office, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law on 21 September 1972 because of mounting agitation and unrests as a result of serious problems in the economy. In addition, he may have had an ulterior motive for

¹⁰⁸ William E. Berry, Jr., *U.S. bases in the Philippines : the evolution of the special relationship* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989)

¹⁰⁹ Cecille S. Visto, "Opposition to VFA Mounts" *BusinessWorld*, 9 June 1999, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 01/23/05)

¹¹⁰ Agoncillo, 495

¹¹¹ Jose Maria Sison, interview by Freedom Siyam, 4 June 2003, from the internet: <http://www.inps-sison.freewebspace.com/anakbayanseattleinterview.htm> (accessed 01/23/05)

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ Alfredo B. Saulo, *Communism in the Philippines: An Introduction* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990), 80-81

declaring martial law to extend his rule beyond the two-term limits.¹¹⁴ Marcos abolished the legislature and arrested anybody who opposed him by branding them “communists.”¹¹⁵

The period of martial law saw the curtailment of the freedom of the press and assembly. Labor unions, student organizations, and the media were silenced. In addition, the Marcos regime took control of utility companies and vital industries owned by his political opponents.¹¹⁶ Another explanation for the declaration of martial law was the belief of leftist-nationalists that Marcos was an “imperialist lackey” who was out to protect American interests and investments in the Philippines.¹¹⁷ At the time when martial law was declared, there was an estimated \$2 to \$3 billion dollars in American investments in the Philippines and the presence of the U.S. military air and naval bases.¹¹⁸ The acquiescence of American policy makers to the suspension of civil liberties in the Philippines after martial law and the continued support of the Marcos regime had a deleterious effect on the political standing of the United States among the Filipino citizens. When the anti-Marcos protests escalated after the assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr. in 1983, the United States also became a target of the protests. “Persistent calls for Marcos’s resignation have increasingly been joined by demands for an end to the U.S. presence in the Philippines.”¹¹⁹

Jose Maria Sison’s *Philippine Society and Revolution* is the most prominent work in the Philippine left in terms of the criticism of the post-independence American military presence in the Philippines. Sison used the ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism-Maoist Thought to analyze the United States and Philippine relationship. Even though the leftist movement in the Philippines fragmented into different factions or ideological

¹¹⁴ Potter and others, *Democratization*, 252

¹¹⁵ Joaquin L. Gonzales, “Philippines: Continuing People Power,” *Government and Politics in Southeast Asia*, ed. John Funston (London: Zed Books, 2001), 254

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Robert E. Klitgaard, “Martial Law in the Philippines,” The Rand Corporation (November 1972), Digital National Security Archive, from the internet: <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/PH/00577/all.pdf> (accessed 01/24/03), 15

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Lawyers Committee for International of Human Rights, “The Philippines a Country in Crisis,” (1983), Digital National Security Archives, from the internet: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/cgi-bin/cqcgi?CQ_SESSION_KEY=XICLFHUCWATO&CQ_DTF_CAT_ITEMS=1&CQDOC=1&CQ_QUE_RY_HANDLE=140508 (accessed 01/23/05), 136

tendencies, the current approaches of these groups regarding the American military presence under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) share a similar thread found in Sison's arguments. The differences of these groups were discussed in Chapter III, Section A of this thesis.

B. THE MILITARY IN THAI POLITICS AND THE UNITED STATES-THAI RELATIONSHIP

Thailand's military had been actively engaged in politics (and had a propensity for coup d'états) even before the American aid was forthcoming at the beginning of the Cold War. There had been four successful coups since 1932 before the American support for the Thai military and police began in the late 1940s.¹²⁰ As a variable, U.S. military aid and presence may not have contributed to these tendencies. However, it cannot be denied that American military and economic aid did strengthen the authoritarian military regimes during this period.

By the 1950s, the provision of U.S. military aid gave the military and the police an overwhelming coercive power not only to contain the threat of communist insurgency, but also to quell legitimate dissent from the Thai citizenry. Civil society's opinion about the U.S. military forward presence during the democratization period (1973-1976) was partly influenced by the public's perception of the American support of the previous Thai military and military-controlled regimes. According to Daniel Fineman, American policy during this period was not compatible with Thai democracy because it sought to increase the Thai military power, repress the criticism of the United States, and conduct covert operations with minimal interference.¹²¹

America's initial entry into Thailand's domestic politics was discrete, but overwhelmingly influential because of the massive amounts of military and economic aid that went along with it. The downfall of the Kuomintang in China and the Chinese Communist Party's founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 was a prelude to

¹²⁰ Aside from the 1932 coup that abolished the absolute monarchy, there were successful coups in 1933, 1947, and 1948. See David K. Wyatt. *Thailand: A Short History*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984)

¹²¹ Daniel Fineman, *A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 7-8

a secret Cold War armed struggle in the border areas of Burma. Kuomintang forces supported by the United States attempted to gain a foothold in the southern province of Yunnan. Thailand became a “front-line” state in the struggle between the opposing forces of the KMT and the CCP. In addition, the American containment strategy to prevent the spread of falling “dominoes” in Asia made Thailand a bulwark against the spread of communism.¹²² The United States needed facilities and bases in Thailand to provide logistical support to KMT forces along the Burma-China border. American officials requested Thailand’s assistance in funneling arms and KMT forces to the Burmese sanctuaries. Since Thailand felt threatened by the expansion of communism along its borders and a potential PRC-supported insurgency, it acceded to the American request. Phibun’s alignment with the United States had an effect on the form of Thai regimes that extended beyond his time.

According to Fineman, prior to granting Thailand the military aid, “...civilians retained a significant voice in the making of the Thai foreign policy.”¹²³ The tremendous amount of U.S. military aid to the Thai armed forces and police increased their clout in relation to the civilian influence over policy decisions.¹²⁴ As the power shifted in favor of the military elites within the Thai government, Phibun and the Coup Group became less tolerant of internal dissent especially from political left.¹²⁵ “The Thai government, as a result, began at this point to promote...authoritarianism that would later lead it to outright dictatorship.”¹²⁶

Between 1951 and 1957, Thailand received \$149 million in economic aid and \$222 million in military aid.¹²⁷ “Even excluding the large covert programs, for which

¹²² National Security Council Staff Study, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia” [Annex to NSC 124], 13 February 1952, from the Digital National Security Archives: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/cgi-bin/cqcggi?CQ_SESSION_KEY=UIFMJNRYSV&CQ_DTF_CAT_ITEM=1&CQDOC=53&CQ_QUERY_HANDLE=147271&CQZOOM=1 (accessed 02/06/05)

¹²³ Fineman, 7-8

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ The Coup Group staged the coup of 8 November 1947. In addition to Phibun, the other active instigators of the coup are Luang Katsongkham, Lieutenant General Phin Chunhawan, Colonel Phao Siyanon, and Colonel Sarit Thanarat. See David K. Wyatt. *Thailand: A Short History*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 264

¹²⁶ Fineman, 67

¹²⁷ Wyatt, 272

figures are not available, the 1953 aid accounted for more than 70 percent of all the money reported spent – Thai and American – on Thai defenses that year.”¹²⁸ The military aid not only funded the modernization of the air force and navy, but it also strengthened the army and the police. The army and the police were the primary services employed as the coercive arm of the state. The Thai Border Police funded by the United States security assistance would later organize the right-wing mass movement in the 1970s called the Village Scouts. The Village Scouts Movement was involved in the suppression of the left-wing student protests against the presence of American military bases in Thailand.¹²⁹

Thai police force grew to about 43,000 men in 1954 and was instrumental in the coercion of the civilian population and the suppression of anti-government movements.¹³⁰ The Coup Group benefited from funds provided by the American military assistance because they were outside the parliament’s budgetary control.¹³¹ This arrangement sometimes placed the legislators at risk because it minimized their leverage in controlling the police and the military. Without parliamentary oversight, the Thai police was able to commit unlawful actions with impunity including the assassination of members of the parliament.¹³²

During the ceremony on 29 June 1951 transferring the American dredge *Manhattan* to the Thai Navy, a group of junior naval officers kidnapped Phibun and held him hostage at the flagship *Si Ayutthaya*.¹³³ The army and the police besieged the naval bases and a CIA-supplied mortar was reportedly used by the police to sink the *Si Ayutthaya* even with the knowledge that Phibun was held hostage in the ship.¹³⁴ “Many Thais, as a result, blamed the United States for the bloodshed accompanying the

¹²⁸ Fineman, 145

¹²⁹ Bowie, 2

¹³⁰ Wyatt, 272

¹³¹ Ibid, 272

¹³² Although Phut Buranasomphop was responsible for killing four members of parliament in 1949, he was still designated by General Phao as the commander of the police “Special Operations Unit” in Burma. Phao was the Chief of Police in Thailand and was a known potential rival of Phibun’s rule. Source: Fineman., 141

¹³³ Fineman, 148

¹³⁴ Ibid, 148-149

conflict.”¹³⁵ An estimated 1,200 casualties, mostly civilians, died in the crossfire when the army and the police attacked the naval bases.¹³⁶

The United States did not underwrite the coercive power of the Thai state with the purpose of undermining democracy in Thailand. However, the corollary of the military aid given to the Thai military and the Ministry of Interior was the expansion of the forces responsible for cracking down on civilian dissent. To translate the impact of U.S. aid in concrete terms:

In 1955, for example, the cumulative U.S. military aid per member of the Thai armed forces was about \$907...What this figure really meant was that each member of the Thai armed forces in 1955 was given approximately \$907 worth of additional capacity to apply physical violence built into him by U.S. military assistance. By comparison, the per capita income of Thailand in 1955 was about \$72.¹³⁷

Vibhatakarasa Jin says that, “For the purpose of intervening in domestic politics, the importance of military resources...was quite obvious. It was the ‘imbalance of growth’ in favor of the military that enabled it to intervene successfully in politics.”¹³⁸ Vibhatakarasa also stated that in Thailand, “the military officers were more authoritarian and more conservative than civilians.”¹³⁹ He based this assessment on data collected from military cadets and college students using a “quasi-longitudinal design.”¹⁴⁰ From the foregoing, it was obvious that the United States had a significant impact on the domestic politics of Thailand by supporting a military that happened to be both authoritarian and ultraconservative.

During the 1960s, the United States became heavily committed to the Vietnam War. American forces needed bases to launch its air attacks against North Vietnam and the neighboring countries that harbor the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). Thailand and the United States signed the Rusk-Thanat [named after then-U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and then-Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman] Agreement with the American

¹³⁵ Fineman, 149

¹³⁶ Ibid, 148

¹³⁷ Vibhatakarasa Jin, 146

¹³⁸ Ibid, 292

¹³⁹ Ibid, 296

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 295

pledge to defend Thailand unilaterally in the event of aggression, without the prior agreement of the other parties to the Manila Pact of 1954.¹⁴¹ This agreement paved the way for the increased American military forward presence in Thailand in the mid-late 1960s. Construction of seven major American air bases in Thailand started in 1965. The new air bases were located at: (1) Nakhon Phanom, (2) Udorn (3) Ubon, (4) Korat, (5) Takhli, (6) Don Muang, and (7) U-Tapao.¹⁴² The U.S. Marine Corps would also open their own base at Nam Phong located northwest of Bangkok.¹⁴³ “Although more than 45,000 United States troops and 500 combat aircraft were stationed in the country by 1968, their mission was not officially acknowledged for fear of possible communist retaliation against Thailand.”¹⁴⁴

The increased American presence on Thailand was preceded by an infusion of military and economic aid. From 1958-1967, Thailand received a total of \$797.6 million in combined military (\$439.2 million) and economic aid (\$358.9 million).¹⁴⁵ During the peak year of American military bases construction and spending in 1968, the level of aggregate demand (GNP) reached 117.3 billion baht (\$5.6 billion at the official exchanged rate).¹⁴⁶ The American net military spending during the same year was \$235 million or 4.2 percent of the GNP, the economic aid was slightly less than one percent and the military aid was one percent of GNP.¹⁴⁷ Considering the multiplier effects of U.S. military spending on the Thai economy, 11 percent of the aggregate demand was

¹⁴¹ Library of Congress Country Studies, “Foreign Affairs – Background,” Thailand – Country Study from the internet: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+th0129\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+th0129)) (accessed 02/06/05)

¹⁴² Jeffrey D. Glasser, *The Secret Vietnam War: The United States Air Force in Thailand, 1961-1975*. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1995), 10

¹⁴³ The U.S. Marine Corps established an airfield at Nam Phong, Thailand after the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive in 1972. An F-4J unit of the Marine Corps called MAG-15 was redeployed to Nam Phong from Danang, South Vietnam in June of that year. Source: “History of Marine Corps Aviation, Vietnam: 1968-1975,” from the internet: <http://www.acepilots.com/usmc/hist19.html> (accessed 02/27/05)

¹⁴⁴ Library of Congress Country Studies, “Thai Politics and Foreign Policy, 1963-1971,” Thailand – Country Study, from the internet: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+th0039\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+th0039)) (accessed 01/28/05)

¹⁴⁵ Wyatt, 284 The total figures of military-economic aid were calculated based on figures from Table 1

¹⁴⁶ George G. Viksnins, “United States Military Spending and the Economy of Thailand, 1967-1972,” *Asian Survey* 13, no. 5 (May 1973), 444

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

estimated to have come from this source.¹⁴⁸ Besides the benefits of the American aid and military spending, Thailand was also motivated to allow American military presence because of security concerns in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. The Laos situation deteriorated into a civil war after the defense minister Phoumi Nosavan ousted the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma from the capital of Vientiane and installed a right-wing regime in December 1960.¹⁴⁹ In Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk established closer relations with China.¹⁵⁰ Thailand severed relations with Prince Sihanouk and instead supported pro-Western forces led by General Lon Nol who ousted Sihanouk in a bloodless coup d'état on 18 March 1970.¹⁵¹ The increasing influence of communism in Indochina was partly used to justify the legitimacy of military rule in Thailand.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, there was a steady growth in education in Thailand that reflected the expansion of the middle classes. Between 1947 and 1970, the number of college graduates in Thailand multiplied by 18.6 times (from 10,000 to 186,000).¹⁵² Secondary education graduates increased by 6.6 times (from 87,000 to 575,000) during the same period.¹⁵³ The growing number of secondary and university graduates gave Thailand a critical mass of an emerging middle class.¹⁵⁴ According to Chai-Anan Samudavanija:

Rapid socioeconomic changes often create uncertainties and sometimes instability and disorder. In fact, democratic values and norms brought about by these changes are the antithesis of , and pose great challenges to,

¹⁴⁸ Viksnins, 444

¹⁴⁹ Souvanna Phouma believed that Laos' chance of survival was through a neutral foreign policy to assuage the concerns of both the Western and the Communist powers. Thai leaders viewed Phouma with suspicion because of his friendly relations with the communist Pathet Lao. See Donald E. Nuechterlein, *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), 174-175

¹⁵⁰ Sihanouk sought a closer relationship with China and the Soviet Union as a counterweight to an aggressive Vietnam. See Kenneth Ray Young, "Neutralism in Laos and Cambodia," *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (June 1970), 223-224

¹⁵¹ Young, 219

¹⁵² Wyatt, 295

¹⁵³ Ibid., 295

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 295

traditional values of the military elites, who welcome modernization and development as long as stability and order can be maintained.¹⁵⁵

The long period of authoritarian rule under Prime Minister Thanom and Deputy Prime Minister Praphat made their regime (1963-1973) complacent and unresponsive to constituents' demands.¹⁵⁶ The incompetence and corruption of the Thanom-Praphat regime gave way to increasing desire for constitutional rule. These sentiments were shared by the broad strata of urban society that included the king of Thailand. The military regime was wracked by a series of scandals. It was also blamed for the insufficient supply of rice to the cities and the onset of rising prices that accompanied the world recession in 1973.¹⁵⁷ By the early 1970s, the Thai middle-class and students began clamoring for political change. The university students led by the leftist National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT) played a major role in the anti-government agitation and demonstrations beginning in June 1973. This flurry of activity culminated in the October Revolution. On 13 October, about 400,000 students marched from Thammasat University to the Democracy Monument in what was then the largest mass action in Thai history.¹⁵⁸ The demonstrations were partly motivated by the students' frustration with the job prospects after graduation and a myriad of other issues.¹⁵⁹ The student protests escalated into a full-blown revolt that toppled General Thanom's regime and ushered a new albeit short era of democracy in Thailand.¹⁶⁰ The brief period of democratization created the conditions for expressing heretofore suppressed freedom of speech, the press and assembly. The process of democratization between 1973 and 1976 rekindled the

¹⁵⁵ Chai-anan Samudavanija, "Thailand: A Stable Semidemocracy," *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990), 352

¹⁵⁶ John S. L. Girling, *Thailand Society and Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 115. The Thanom and Praphat regime succeeded General Sarit's authoritarian rule after his death in 1963. General Sarit Thanarat's regime (1958-1963) took power after a coup in 1958 which abrogated the 1952 constitution and dissolved the Pote Sarasin caretaker government. Prior to this, Sarasin's government succeeded Phibun's regime in 1957 when the latter fled into exile. (See Girling, 110-113)

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ See Bowie, 94. See also Wyatt, 299

¹⁵⁹ "In October 1973 police arrested lecturers and undergraduates organizing a meeting to protest about the delays in constitutional reform. This triggered a mass rally at Thammasat University that was joined by other universities." Source: Elliot Kulick and Dick Wilson, *Thailand's Turn: Profile of a New Dragon* (London: MacMillan Press, 1992), 28

¹⁶⁰ Thanom Kittikachorn ruled as the military dictator of Thailand from 1963 until his regime was overthrown by the student revolt in 1973. Source: Kulick and Wilson, 28-29

debates about the presence of American military bases in Thailand. The role of the students in anti-American political mobilization became more manifest during the anti-military bases protests after the *Mayaguez* incident in 1975.

The communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam in 1975 and the consolidation of the Pathet Lao in neighboring Laos increased anxieties in Thailand. With the U.S. military drawdown in Indochina and the American rapprochement with China, the Thai government had doubts about the American commitment to defend Thailand. As a result, the Thai government wanted to improve relations with neighboring communist states like China and Cambodia. It was during this period of uneasiness when the Khmer Rouge seized the American merchant vessel the *Mayaguez*. The United States military attempted to recover the ship and her crew using air bases in Thailand. Prior to this action, the Kukrit Pramoj¹⁶¹ government informed the American *charge d'affaires* that it would not authorize the use of Thai bases against Cambodia.¹⁶² The Thai government filed a protest when American forces used military bases in Thailand without the proper authorization.¹⁶³

The *Mayaguez* incident is still remembered in Thailand as one of the low points in Thai-American relations, referring to the U.S.-Thai trade relations in 1999, a Bangkok Post article stated:

Recent events have stirred a widespread sense of nationalism and anti-Americanism among Thai people for the first time since the Mayaguez incident 27 years ago. At the time, America arrogantly sent troops to Thailand to seize its ship back from the Khmer Rouge without prior consultation with Thailand. This violation of sovereignty triggered anti-American resentment among Thai people nationwide. Many came out to protest and rallied in front of the US Embassy.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Seni Pramoj was elected in the January 1975 elections with no clear majority. The House voted a no confidence on 6 March and dissolved the newly formed government. Kukrit Pramoj, his brother, managed to form a successor government with a new coalition of seventeen parties of the center and the right. Kukrit negotiated a promised withdrawal of American troops and a resumption of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Source: Wyatt, 301. See also Samudavanija, 332

¹⁶² "The National Student Center accused the U.S. of using the seizure of the Mayaguez as a pretext to intervene again in Indochina. A Thai government spokesman accused the U.S. [sic] May 15 of committing a 'breach of faith' in using Thai territory for recovery of the Mayaguez." Source: "U.S. Force Battle Cambodians, Destroy Three Gunboats, Retake Seized American Ship; 39 U.S. crewmen rescued," from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/10/05)

¹⁶³ Glasser, 214

¹⁶⁴ "Friends for life?" Bangkok Post, 30 May 1999, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/10/05)

Kukrit Pramoj's foreign policy of non-alignment involved a reduction of American forces in Thailand, recognition of the PRC, and rapprochement with Vietnam and Kampuchea. This move was influenced by the external events previously mentioned. On the domestic front, the political mobilization of left-wing and liberal social forces (student groups, labor unions, academics, "left" democratic parties) had continued unabated since the 1973 student revolt. This alarmed both military officials and the wealthy elite.¹⁶⁵ "The rightist reaction took the form of building up the *Nawaphon* [rightist] movement, rallying around the patriotic theme of 'Nation, Religion, King,' mobilizing the royally sponsored 'village scouts,' vocational student gangs, and demagogic media personalities against the 'left'..."¹⁶⁶ According to Girling, the return of former dictators Thanom and Praphat was part of the rightist strategy to provoke student protests which culminated in the October 6 military-police and rightists crackdown at Thammasat University.¹⁶⁷ The right-wing violence at Thammasat was followed by a military coup and the declaration of martial law which abolished the previous constitution and prohibited political parties. Opposition members were harassed and hundreds of political activists fled abroad in self-exile or joined the underground. Some of the students who sought refuge in the rural areas joined the broad "united front" of the combined socialist and communist parties.¹⁶⁸

A critic of the American military presence in 1973 stated with both hindsight and prescience that, "...the presence of foreign forces encourages and fosters what may be called 'military democracy,' an authoritarian regime which deprives or curtails the

¹⁶⁵ Girling, *Thailand Society and Politics*, 116

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. See also Bowie, *Rituals of National Loyalty*, 105-106 for a brief description of the *Nawaphon* and the Red Gaur (*Krathing Daeng*) recruitment, organization, and activities. According to Bowie, *Nawaphon* was founded by Wattana Kiewvimol and claimed membership of 150,000 in 1975. Its members were recruited from the elite, e.g., members of the provincial bureaucracy, influential businessmen, as well as monks. In contrast, the Red Gaurs was a right-wing organization of hired vigilantes drawn mainly from unemployed vocational graduates, high school drop-outs and slum toughs. The Red Gaurs was directly organized by Colonel Sudsai Hasadin, the leader of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). Red Gaurs vigilantes were notorious for violence like the firebombing of the liberal New Force Party headquarters in Bangkok. This was the same group suspected of attacking the anti-American demonstrators with grenades and plastic bombs during a protest on 21 March 1976. The demonstrators were demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Thailand.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 116-117

¹⁶⁸ David Morell and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Thailand's Revolutionary Insurgency: Changes in Leadership Potential," *Asian Survey* 19, no. 4 (April 1979), 320

freedom and civil liberties of citizens.”¹⁶⁹ The political left is no longer a significant force in present-day Thailand. However, the voice of leftist nationalism would occasionally echo in the discourse of individual liberals in the media, academia and the political institutions. These critics enunciated their concern about the American military forward presence in Thailand during the recent conflicts in the Middle East and even during the tsunami relief operations that was based at Utapao.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ Thanat Khoman, “Thailand in the Midst of Changes,” *Trends in Thailand*, ed. M. Rajaretnam and Lim So Jean (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973), 110-114. Cited from Darling, *Thailand Society and Politics*, 239

¹⁷⁰ “Military and civilian agencies from other countries cooperated with the US troops in bringing relief to the devastated areas amid suspicion among local and regional nationalists that the base might be used for hidden military operations.” Source: “Rumours Spreads on Increased Presence of U.S. Military in Thailand,” 2 February 2005, *Thai Press Reports*, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/07/05)

III. DEVELOPMENT OF GROUPS OPPOSED TO U.S. MILITARY FORWARD PRESENCE

Groups opposed to the American military forward presence in both Thailand and the Philippines were a product of history and ideology. The left-wing nationalists in the Philippines view the current access issues related to the VFA and the MLSA as the continuation of the drama that had roots in the colonial and the neocolonial past. They still see the new agreements as “neocolonial” regardless of U.S. good faith in respecting the Philippine decision not to extend the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in 1991. Philippine sovereignty over the American bases was amply demonstrated when the Philippine Senate voted 12 to 11 against the extension of the MBA beyond 1991.¹⁷¹

The current discourse from the far left represented by Sison’s CPP remained heavily laden with ideological bombast that reflects a typical Marxist-Leninist *weltanschauung* of the Cold War era. Sison and his ilk still see the CPP as the vanguard party that could save the Philippines from the grasp of a Manichean plot hatched by “U.S. imperialism and monopoly capitalism.” The CPP and its allies in the NDF view armed struggle as the only route to change the system, i.e., this section of the left is anti-system even though it supported the “legal struggle” via electoral participation of “national democratic” leftist party-list candidates in the last elections.

In sharp contrast, there is a portion of the Philippine left that genuinely believes that the era of “vanguard party” elitism is a thing of the past. A variety of leftists and center-left groups has a stake in the current political system and seeks changes via participation in the existing political institutions and processes as the norm, and not just a tactic of revolutionary struggle. Because of the open debates in the political process, any American requests for access to base facilities during contingencies have a better chance of approval in the Philippine Congress if it is congruent with the perceived or defined Philippine national interests. Unlike the ideological basis in nationalism of the CPP and the NDF, which totally rule out any American military presence, the center-left politicians in the legislature are likely to consider the issue on a case by case basis.

¹⁷¹ “Philippine Senate Rejects Base Treaty with U.S.,” 16 September 1991, Central News Agency – Taiwan, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/11/05)

The right-wing nationalist movement dissipated after the closure of the American bases at Clark and Subic Bay in 1991 and 1992, respectively. This movement may be latent and cannot be totally ruled out because its ideas and sentiments remain, as evidenced by the reaction from certain quarters of the Philippine military to the forward presence of American military personnel in Mindanao in 2004 (see below).

Filipino Muslim opposition to the American military presence in the Philippines coalesced around leftist (secular) organized protest activities in Manila or religious-based political mobilization in predominantly Muslim areas in the southern Philippines. The NDF established a front organization called the Moro Revolutionary Organization (MRO) as an “underground organization of Moro people in Mindanao, southern Philippines” (See Appendix A). It is not clear if some of the protests in Mindanao were related to the MILF insurgent activity or if it was organized by independent Muslim groups or individuals.

The political left in Thailand was decimated by rightist violence in the 1970s and has been in hiatus ever since. Those who belong to the generation of leftist student activists in the 1970s are now respected members of the establishment, e.g., business, media, politics, and the academia.¹⁷² Complaints against the United States military access to Thai base facilities are often heard from a variety of individuals that ranged from members of the parliament to journalists. The Thai Muslim protests against the American military forward presence in Thailand and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to be organized by a variety of civil society groups.

A. LEFTIST NATIONALISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

Even before the 1972 declaration of martial law in the Philippines, the political left was divided into the Maoist (CPP), Marxist-Leninist (old PKP) and the non-

¹⁷² Patricio Abinales suggested that like in the Philippines some former elements of the Left in Thailand found themselves in the corridors of power years later. “(We have something similar going on under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Sergio Berlusconi’s Thai counterpart; ex-Maoists crafting his corporatization of the Thai state; and likewise in Indonesia where old Bandung radicals now form the inner circle of President Megawati Sukarnoputri).” Source: Patricio Abinales, “Which Anti-Communism? Reflections from the Philippines,” *Center for Southeast Asian Studies*, Kyoto University, from the internet: <http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/icas/Patricio.pdf> (accessed 02/12/05)

communist left (mainly the social democrats). After 1972, the political left went underground to avoid persecution by the Marcos regime. The Communist Party of the Philippines (Maoist faction) brought many of the left-wing elements in the anti-fascist (anti-Marcos) struggle under an umbrella organization (united front) called the National Democratic Front that was established on 24 April 1973.¹⁷³ CPP leaders envisioned the NDF as a political action agency that “...seeks to develop and coordinated [sic] all progressive classes, sectors and forces in the Filipino people's struggle to end the political rule of US [sic] imperialism and its local allies in the Philippines, and attain genuine national liberation and democracy.”¹⁷⁴

The NDF-aligned front organizations were organized into various interest groups, e.g., workers, youth and students, church groups, farmers, women, professionals, artists, and urban poor (See Appendix A). From the perspective of the NDF, it “...is the formal united front of the organizations of the basic forces of the revolution, comprising of the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie.”¹⁷⁵ NDF organizations and their members operated in a clandestine manner even though their political actions were manifested in above-ground “cause-oriented” political groups. The CPP was ostensibly only a member of the NDF according to the latter’s table of organization.¹⁷⁶ However, in practice the party cadres have control or influence on the key positions within the “united front” and its component organizations. As a Marxist-Leninist party, the CPP believes in the primacy of a “vanguard party” in directing the course of a revolutionary struggle. It was not uncommon to have policy differences between the CPP leaders and the party members in the United Front Commission (UFC) because the communist party had much

¹⁷³ “What is NDF [?]” National Democratic Front, from the internet: <http://home.wanadoo.nl/ndf/about/index.html> (accessed 02/12/05)

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ “What is the NDF?” from the internet: <http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/fil/ndf.html> (accessed 12/11/04)

stricter ideological standards.¹⁷⁷ The party members assigned to the UFC have to work with non-communist activists in the broader alliance of the NDF. To attract these political activists into such an alliance, the NDF has to widen its political program beyond the CPP paradigm. For example, the NDF ten-point program “...had been revised in 1977 to tone down the shrill Maoist syntax in the original document.”¹⁷⁸ The NDF political program pledged to have a “democratic coalition government” that would “allow the free interplay of national and democratic forces during and after elections.”¹⁷⁹ There have been occasional tensions between the CPP and the NDF that arose from ideological differences:

By 1984, party leaders had begun assuming what were called “dogmatic positions.” The independence of the NDF had been “overstretched,” it was charged, and the Central Committee began to tighten its control.¹⁸⁰

The assassination of opposition politician Benigno Aquino Jr. polarized the country and expanded the ranks of the opposition, including the NDF. The rapid growth of the “united front” organization meant that there was less emphasis on ideology in the recruitment criteria for the NDF; this affected the communist party as well.¹⁸¹ The CPP ran into problems when its cadres became less tolerant of their non-communist allies who did not agree with the NDF program. The “contradictions” became more obvious when

¹⁷⁷ According to a CPP member who assumed the leadership of the UFC in 1980, she was shocked by the rigidity of the recruitment rules in the NDF which limited the criteria to only the “basic masses,” i.e., lower-class industrial workers and poor and “lower-middle” peasants “...deemed reliable forces for the movement.” The party cadres in Manila were afraid to broaden their contacts with middle and upper classes because of the CPP line that these classes are unreliable, viz., “the lower-class masses are the makers of history.” Source: Gregg R. Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 147

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 150

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. See also William Chapman, *Inside the Philippine Revolution* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), 221

¹⁸⁰ After the Benigno Aquino assassination in 1983 and the downturn in the economy, massive political demonstrations erupted. The CPP argued that the “people’s war” had entered the advance sub-stage of “strategic defensive” and would be entering the final stage called the “strategic offensive.” NDF leaders like Zumel argued that the political struggle is just as important as the military component of the revolution. Source: Richard J. Kessler, *Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 91

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 91-92

prominent leftists proposed that unarmed political mobilization is the more relevant method in the anti-Marcos struggle.¹⁸² This ran against the CPP's Maoist doctrine of the "people's war" strategy.

There were also disagreements within the CPP after the party Executive Committee committed the grave error of adopting a boycott policy towards the 1986 presidential elections pitting Mrs. Corazon Aquino against Ferdinand Marcos. The controversial result of the elections was one of the catalysts that triggered the People's Power revolt in 1986. Marcos was overthrown by massive demonstrations of common citizens who came out to protect and insulate the soldiers who rebelled against his regime.¹⁸³ The military revolt encouraged the defection of other AFP units to the side of the opposition. When the United States withdrew support from Marcos, he stepped down from power and went into exile in Hawaii. As a result of the boycott policy, the CPP and some of its front organizations found themselves isolated from the rest of the opposition forces. Even in one Manila suburb considered to be a communist stronghold, the CPP officials were shocked to discover that "70 percent of the membership of Party-led unions disobeyed the boycott order and voted."¹⁸⁴

Since the democratization started, there were changes in the Philippine laws that altered the definition of the CPP and its related organizations. Then-president Fidel Ramos repealed the Anti-Subversion Law and legalized the status of the Communist Party.¹⁸⁵ In spite of these changes, the CPP vowed to continue its armed struggle.¹⁸⁶ Jose Maria Sison chose to keep the front organizations of the NDF underground even

¹⁸² Randolph David, a respected leftist UP sociology professor, was labeled by the Central Committee paper *Ang Bayan* as a "petty-bourgeois intellectual kibitzer" for making such a suggestion in his thesis paper. Source: Jones, 150

¹⁸³ Bryan Johnson, *The Four Days of Courage: The Untold Story of the People Who Brought Down Marcos* (New York: The Free Press, 1987)

¹⁸⁴ Jones, 159

¹⁸⁵ "Ramos legalizes Philippine Communist Party," 22 September 1992, *United Press International*, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/11/05)

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. See also, Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal, "Arroyo regime proving that armed revolution is necessary and viable," 8 February 2005, Philippine Revolution Web Central, from the internet: <http://www.philippinerevolution.org/cgi-in/statements/statements.pl?author=kr;date=050208;language=eng> (accessed 02/11/05)

though they were no longer considered illegal.¹⁸⁷ As a result the tactics, techniques and procedures of the “reaffirmist” faction of the CPP remained the same even after the creation of the democratic space.

The various underground front groups advocated the political issues that were relevant to the sectors they represented. For example, the “Revolutionary Council of Trade Unions,” which the NDF describes as an alliance of revolutionary trade unions, has members who operate within “above-ground” or legal trade unions. According to Kessler, the “NDF began issuing a worker’s paper, *Proletaryo*, in September 1979, and at an organizing meeting in May 1980 at Manila’s Araneta Coliseum, the group founded the May First Movement (*Kilusang Mayo Uno* or KMU).”¹⁸⁸ Kessler added that because the KMU and other front organizations were overt and their members were probably not all communist party affiliates, the NDF cannot always ensure control of these labor unions.¹⁸⁹

Similarly, the *Kabataang Makabayan* (Patriotic Youth) members operate clandestinely within legal leftist student and youth organizations, e.g., the League of Filipino Students (LFS)¹⁹⁰. The advantage of this arrangement was that it enabled these above-ground front organizations to organize political discussions around issues that affect their main constituencies. From that vantage point, these “cause-oriented” groups were able to link local matters to national issues, e.g., campus nationalism vs. American military presence. The propaganda strategy included a “bait & switch” tactic that lured followers with campus issues (tuition-fee hikes, academic freedom and nationalism) and then linked them to the anti-U.S. agenda that is presented at the bigger student

¹⁸⁷ For example, Sison stated that “The KM has chosen to be in the underground in the Philippines in order to guard against the possibility that the imperialists and reactionaries might again try to wipe out legally existing patriotic and progressive organizations as in 1972.” Source: Jose Maria Sison, “Interview with Prof. Jose Maria Sison,” 4 June 2003, Interview by Freedom Siyam, from the internet: <http://www.inps-sison.freewebspace.com/anakbayanseattleinterview.htm> (accessed 02/11/05)

¹⁸⁸ Kessler, 90

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 91

¹⁹⁰ The members of these “above-ground” organizations are not all CPP or NDF members. Therefore, they are technically not communist organizations by strict definition. Filipino security officials sometimes run into a *faux pas* with labeling issues and were often accused by the leftist groups with “red-baiting.” However, the political line espoused by these groups was undeniably the same as the CPP-NDF sans the “armed struggle” party line.

demonstrations.¹⁹¹ The local issues were sometimes the primary mobilizing tool to incite the university crowd and steer it to the political events outside the campuses, e.g., at the American Embassy.¹⁹² Similar tactics were used to attract participants from the labor unions, environmental groups, church associations, women's movement, and others.

Since the serious split in the CPP in 1992, the groups and individuals who left or were expelled from the communist party have formed their own groups and parties. The "rejectionists" camp was actually composed of at least seven separate groups. During an interview, former CPP member Nathan Gilbert Quimpo stated:

The most positive consequence [of the split] has been the emergence of a more pluralist Left and there's no more hegemony on the part of the Communist Party of the Philippines–National Democratic Front–New People's Army (CPP–NDF–NPA). We have a Left which is now more plural. Today, there are about seven main groupings within the Left including the CPP and the *Partido Demokratiko–Sosyalista ng Pilipinas* (PDSP), the mainstream social democratic party. In between these two there are five other groups. If you include the *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP), there are eight. The PKP, the old pro–Moscow party, has not been that active and is very much weakened since the late 1980s.¹⁹³

The "rejectionists" groups have different strategies for achieving political power that is distinct from the CPP. Some of these groups rejected the idea of a "people's democratic republic" and the Maoist strategy of "people's war."¹⁹⁴ In addition, most of them do not accept the Maoist "semi-feudal and semi-colonial" analysis of the Philippine

¹⁹¹ "In 1977, the League of Filipino Students (LFS) was formed with a three-part program: restore democracy on campus, end the imperialist control of education, and dismantle the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship." Source: Kessler, 89. The LFS started as a student alliance against the tuition fee increases. It was active in advocating for the return of the student councils, uncensored student publications, and the withdrawal of the military presence in the campuses. Source: "What is the League of Filipino Students?" LFS Website, from the internet: <http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Field/4927/lfs/lfs2.htm> (accessed 02/11/05)

¹⁹² The LFS and other militant youth groups were among the participants of protests against the "Balikatan" U.S.-R.P. military exercises. Source: Vincent Cabreza and Desiree Caluza, "Protestant Group Slams Balikatan," 31 January 2002, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/11/05)

¹⁹³ Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, "The Left and Democratisation in the Philippines," interview by Emere Distor, 18 April 2003, Solidarity Philippines Australia Network, from the internet: <http://www.cpcabrisbane.org/Kasama/2003/V17n2/Quimpo.htm> (accessed 02/11/05)

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

society or world situation.¹⁹⁵ Quimpo said that the “rejectionist” factions can be roughly divided into five camps which he described as follows:

- (1) *Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas* (RPM-P) [Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines] – strategy similar to Vietnamese-style of revolution using a combined political-military framework.
- (2) *Partido ng Manggagawang Pilipino* (PMP) [Philippine Workers Party] – insurrectional type of strategy similar to the People Power revolts.
- (3) Marxist–Leninist Party of the Philippines (MLPP) – broke away from the CPP in 1997. Considers itself the “genuine” reaffirmist of the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.
- (4) *Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Mindanao* (RPM–Mindanao) [Revolutionary Workers Party – Mindanao] – used to be part of the RPM-P during its founding Congress in 1998. Broke away from the RPM-P in 2000 because of differences related to the negotiations of the peace agreement with the President Estrada administration.
- (5) *Akbayan* [Citizens Action Party] – a “multi-tendency” party composed of several political blocs. Two of the original blocs, *Siglaya* and the Movement for Popular Democracy, were from the “national democratic” movement (NDF-aligned) in the past. The “popdems” or popular democrats had disbanded as a political tendency. Only a section of the *Siglaya* stayed with *Akbayan*. The other two political tendencies in *Akbayan* are not from the “national democratic” tradition. These are the *Bukluran sa Ikaunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa* (BISIG) – independent socialist group – and the *Pandayan para sa Sosyalistang Pilipinas* (from the social democratic tradition).¹⁹⁶

According to Nathan Quimpo, the PMP, RPM-P and the CPP remain focused on the seizure of state power while *Akbayan* leans more toward the neo-Gramscian concept of “counter-hegemony” by building power within civil society and among the people.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ Quimpo, “The Left and Democratisation”

¹⁹⁶ Items 1 through 5 were enumerated by Nathan Quimpo during his interview. Source: Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Antonio Gramsci was an Italian socialist intellectual and prolific writer who was imprisoned by dictator Benito Mussolini. Gramsci wrote numerous notes and essays while in prison including his ideas about “hegemony” and “counter-hegemony.” See notes in Quimpo, “The Left and Democratisation.” See also Frank Rosengarten, “Introduction to Gramsci’s Life and Thought,” posted 18 February 2002, from the internet: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/intro.htm> (accessed 02/26/05)

The state of affairs in the Philippine left remains controversial. In the CPP newspaper's 7 December 2004 issue, the International Department of the party labeled several groups in the "rejectionist" camp of being "counter-revolutionaries with links to international Trotskyites and Social Democrats."¹⁹⁸ UP Professor Walden Bello and Representative Loretta Ann Rosales, both leaders of the *Akbayan*, were concerned because their names appeared on the CPP "hit list."¹⁹⁹ The *Akbayan* leaders have reason to fear because the CPP-NPA was implicated in the assassination of several leftist leaders in the "rejectionist" camp. The CPP-NPA admitted to assassinating Arturo Tabara, the national chairman of the RPM-P on 26 September 2004, accusing him of conniving with the military.²⁰⁰ Police investigators were also looking into the possible connections of the killing of Tabara with the assassinations of two former CPP-NPA leaders Romulo "Romy" Kintanar (killed in 2003) and Filemon "Popoy" Lagman (killed in 2001).²⁰¹

Akbayan was a vocal critic of President Arroyo's policy to allow American forces to participate in the *Balikatan* 03-1 exercises at Sulu in 2003. It stated that the mere presence of U.S. troops was a "provocation."²⁰² Unlike the NDF-aligned organizations, *Akbayan* refrains from using hyper-nationalistic Maoist jargon.²⁰³ The CPP-NDF still use shrill ranting about the three "isms" (imperialism, bureaucratic-capitalism and feudalism).

Groups like *Akbayan* focus on developing participatory democracy and not armed revolution. Unlike the CPP, whose goal is to supplant the system of "cacique democracy" with a "people's democratic republic" ruled by a vanguard party, the

¹⁹⁸ "Joma warns 2 *Akbayan* Execs they face CPP probe," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 28 December 2004, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/11/05)

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ "Collaboration between Tabara and the Reactionary Regime," *Ang Bayan*, 7 October 2004, Philippine Revolution Web Central, from the internet: <http://www.philippinerevolution.org/cgi-bin/archive/archive.pl> (accessed 02/11/05), 4

²⁰¹ Christian V. Esguerra and Juliet Labog-Javellana, "NPA hand seen in killing of ex-rebel," 28 September 2004, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, from the Lexis-Nexis database (02/11/05)

²⁰² Donna S. Cueto, " Militants blame Reyes for entry of U.S. Troops," 27 February 2003, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, from Lexis-Nexis database (02/11/05)

²⁰³ See the *Akbayan* website for their background and political platform. From the internet: <http://www.akbayan.org/about.htm> (accessed 02/11/05)

Akbayan seeks to transform the shortcomings of the existing political institutions to “deepen Philippine democracy.”²⁰⁴ The gist of *Akbayan*’s foreign policy *weltanschauung* is as follows,

Our foreign policy should be anchored on effective negotiations for national interests, on building mutual respect in our relations with [the] United States and other advanced capitalist countries, on shared interests among Asian peoples and governments, on support for human rights and democratization. We are opposed to [former] Ramos administration plans to restore extra-territorial powers to the American military. Our ports and airports should be accessible to all friendly commercial and military traffic without special privileges to any country.²⁰⁵

From the above statement, the *Akbayan* does not totally rule out U.S. military access to ports and airport facilities. However, it was critical of the “extra-territorial powers” that an agreement like the VFA represents. The definition of the “friendly commercial and military traffic without special privileges” was also vague and may be subject to debate and interpretation as to who is “friendly.” In contrast to the CPP and NDF perspective of globalization as “evil and bad,” the *Akbayan* Party views it as causing both problems and opportunities.²⁰⁶

Akbayan legislator Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel was critical of the present American military deployment in Mindanao. She stated, “Under the guise of cooperation and technical assistance, America is trampling on our national sovereignty. This is intervention. We must resist them.”²⁰⁷ Her remark was in response to the American ambassador’s earlier disclosure that seventy American intelligence and military experts were in Mindanao to assist with information gathering related to the American-Filipino

²⁰⁴See the *Akbayan* website for their background and political platform. From the internet: <http://www.akbayan.org/about.htm> (accessed 02/11/05)

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ “Globalization creates many problems even as it also generates new opportunities. Old style nationalism is incapable of telling the difference between problems and opportunities. For the 21st century, we need a robust, realistic nationalism to advance the interests of the whole nation instead of only the few.” Source: Ibid.

²⁰⁷ “AKBAYAN solon questions continued US military presence in the South; demands immediate pull out,” 11 February 2005, *Akbayan* website, from the internet: http://www.akbayan.org/press_release_021105.htm (accessed 02/14/05)

training exercises.²⁰⁸ The ambassador's comment sparked tempers among nationalist groups because of concerns that the American "strategy experts" were spying on Filipinos. Admiral Fargo, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, clarified that the American experts were sent to provide training and assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and not to spy.²⁰⁹

Although the political left in the Philippines is split because of major differences, the various factions of the "rejectionists" and the "reaffirmist" camps were vocal in unison when they expressed opposition to the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) in 2002.²¹⁰ Party-list Bayan Muna (a legal "national democratic" organization), *Akbayan*, *Sanlakas*, *Kilusan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya* (KPD), Cordillera People's Alliance and other organizations expressed their sentiments against the MLSA.²¹¹ About thirty-nine groups composed of national democrats, social democrats and popular democrats, religious and academic groups, non-governmental organizations, and even some members of the old PKP (pro-Moscow communist party) joined forces to oppose the *Balikatan* 02-1 U.S.-R.P. military exercises in Zamboanga and Basilan in 2002.²¹² These groups represented a small sampling of the organizations that belong to separate leftist camps.

B. RIGHT-WING NATIONALISM IN THE PHILIPPINES POST-1986 PEOPLE POWER REVOLT

The Philippine democratic transition in 1986 was followed by several right-wing coup attempts against President Cory Aquino's administration. The tumultuous 1980s saw the rise of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) as a destabilizing force in the Philippine military. After playing a role in the ouster of the Marcos regime, the politicized RAM retained its momentum by intervening in the politics of the country. In

²⁰⁸ "U.S. Spies Here to Train Not Spy," *Manila Standard*, 10 February 2005, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/11/05)

²⁰⁹ "U.S. Spies Here to Train Not Spy"

²¹⁰ Norman Bordadora and Cynthia D. Balana, "Guingona Leads Loud Protests vs MLSA," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 23 November 2002, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/19/05)

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Robert JA Basilio, Jr., "Opposition to U.S. troop deployment in R.P. unites Left, progressive forces," 28 January 2002, *Manila CyberDyaryo*, from FBIS database (accessed 12/10/04)

conjunction with other right-wing groups like the Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP), and the Young Officers Union (YOU), the RAM staged its most serious coup attempt in December 1989, prompting President Aquino to seek the military intervention of the United States. The American president ordered U.S. Air Force F-4C fighters stationed at Clark Air Base to conduct “persuasion flights” above Philippine military rebel bases to dissuade them from attacking government facilities and military bases loyal to the Cory Aquino government. Prior to the American intervention, rebel planes bombed the constabulary headquarters at Camp Crame and a RAM helicopter machine-gunned loyal government troops at Camp Aguinaldo.²¹³ Although, the U.S. Air Force planes did not fire at the military rebel forces, the RAM and their allies were more than annoyed by the American intervention. The right-wing movement resented the American “meddling” in the Philippine internal affairs and joined the nationalist campaign to oust the U.S. military bases in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Like right-wing groups in Thailand (see Section B, Chapter II), the RAM was ideologically anti-communist and nationalistic in its own right. The core group of RAM was composed of AFP officers from the Philippine Military Academy class of 1971.²¹⁴ Many of these officers were veterans of the counter-insurgency wars against the communists and Muslim secessionists in the 1970s and the 1980s.²¹⁵ Historically, the AFP had a strong relationship with the United States armed forces, as evidenced by the significant role played by the U.S. Joint Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) and the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in the training of some units and officers in the AFP. The JUSMAG had been supportive of the AFP education and training since the 1950s.²¹⁶

The RAM/SFP/YOU published statements of opposition to the presence of the American military bases while the December 1989 coup was in progress. Why did some officers of the Philippine military suddenly turn against the United States in 1989?

²¹³ Robert H. Reid and Eileen Guerrero, *Corazon Aquino and Brushfire the Revolution*, (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 164

²¹⁴ Bryan Johnson, *The Four Days of Courage*, 38

²¹⁵ Alfred W. McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999) See also Bryan Johnson, *The Four Days of Courage*, 38

²¹⁶ William E. Berry, Jr., *U.S. Bases in the Philippines: The Evolution of the Special Relationship*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 76

According to Benjamin Pimentel, Jr., "...the 'persuasion flights' had sparked a current of anti-Americanism in the Philippine military never before seen in the history of the AFP."²¹⁷

President Bush [Sr.] ordered F-4 Phantom jets to fly over the capital [Manila on] Dec. 1 after [Filipino] rebel planes bombed and strafed the presidential palace. Philippine and foreign military experts generally agree that the coup could not have been quashed without the "persuasion" flights, which kept rebel planes from taking off.²¹⁸

Pimentel added, "In March 1990, the Young Officers Union publicly denounced US [sic] domination in the Armed Forces [of the Philippines] and in Philippine society in general."²¹⁹ The YOU was a more radical element than the RAM because it had adopted an "anti-imperialist" line and even considered an alliance with the communists if the CPP will drop its Marxist-Leninist ideology.²²⁰ Members of the YOU were influenced by Nilo Tayag, a former communist cadre who started nationalist seminars in the military in the early 1980s.²²¹ Tayag's seminars on Filipino ideology or "Filipinism" were described as a "non-communist Left alternative to imperialism, fascism and communism."²²² The Young Officers Union was organized into cells of less than ten members, like the communist movement.²²³ The inner core of the YOU came from the Philippine Constabulary intelligence officers²²⁴ who had been monitoring the communist movement's activities. These military officers were impressed by the organizational savvy and ideological commitment of the communist cadres. They recognized a need to fill the ideological vacuum in the rank and file of the AFP. The YOU recruiters were

²¹⁷ Benjamin Pimentel, Jr., "The United States: Savior or Intruder," *Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy*, (Manila, R.P.: Recon Printing Press, 1990), 140

²¹⁸ Ronald E. Yates, "Aquino: No compromise in U.S. aid during coup try," 12 December 1989, *Chicago Tribune*, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/05/05)

²¹⁹ Pimentel, 140

²²⁰ Glenda Gloria, "YOU: The Soldier as Nationalist," *Kudeta*, 135

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Reid and Guerrero, 160-161

²²⁴ YOU was formally launched on 8 August 1988 with eight officers meeting at 8 p.m. The December 1989 coup was planned and organized by RAM with only a minor role played by YOU in the decision process. Source: Gloria, 136-137

successful in forming secret political cells inside the Scout Ranger companies that participated in the 1989 coup attempt.²²⁵

As early as 1986, some members of the RAM showed signs of anti-American sentiment as a result of the belief or suspicion that the United States government may have tipped-off the intelligence service of President Marcos about the impending coup that triggered the People's Power revolt.²²⁶ The anti-American sentiment in right-wing organizations could also be explained within the context of the nationalistic milieu of the 1980s. The radical left has verbally attacked the Philippine military as "running dogs of U.S. imperialism" since the Marcos era. Under the prevailing circumstances, the nationalistic officers in the AFP who belong to the RAM and the YOU may have over *compensated* (ego defense mechanism) by adopting a more radical anti-American stance. Nationalism in the ranks of the AFP was often underrated by the critics on the left, even though significant numbers of Filipino soldiers fought and died in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic during the Mindanao insurgencies in the 1970s to the present period.

RAM and the other groups involved in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts reached a peace agreement with the government in 1995 and were granted unconditional amnesty.²²⁷ The RAM had since renamed itself the *Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabayan* (RAM) or Revolutionary Patriotic Alliance. According to Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus (AFP Civil Relations Chief), the communist had been trying to form an alliance with rightist groups like the RAM to oust the present Macapagal-Arroyo government.²²⁸ The right-wing nationalist groups in the Philippines do not have a significant political machine to organize anti-American protest mobilization. However, they can adversely affect the economy with destabilizing coup attempts. They could also align with groups

²²⁵ Gloria, 136-137

²²⁶ Bryan Johnson, *The Four Days of Courage: The Untold Story of the People Who Brought Marcos Down*, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1987), 86-89

²²⁷ "Former coup plotters reach agreement with Philippine government," 13 October 1995, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 12/13/04)

²²⁸ Alcuin Papa, "Corpus Bares Left-Right bid to oust GMA," 26 June 2004, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, from Lexis-Nexis database (access 12/13/04)

that have the organizational resources to employ an agitation-propaganda campaign, viz., the CPP-NDF is exploring methods of co-opting nationalistic elements in the Philippine military and police.²²⁹

C. MORO NATIONALISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

With the exception of the Abu Sayyaf, the former Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) members and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have not conducted any overt propaganda or physical attacks against American interests. The MNLF was absorbed into the government and the AFP after the peace agreement in 1996.²³⁰ The Philippine government is currently negotiating the resumption of the peace talks with the MILF. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) met with the International Monitoring Team from Malaysia and members of the MILF to discuss ways to facilitate the peace process.²³¹ USIP is an NGO formed by the U.S. Congress and supported by the U.S. State Department. The United States offered a \$30 million economic aid package that is contingent upon the conclusion of the peace agreement between the MILF and the Philippine government.²³² The MILF does not have a clear position on the issue of future American military access or presence in the Philippines.

Muslim mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s stoked the Moro nationalism and religious identities that led to the formation of the MNLF. The MILF became a splinter faction of the MNLF in the early 1980s. During the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Filipino Muslims in Mindanao participated in demonstrations against the United States. About 10,000 Muslims shouted “Jihad, jihad!” and “Death to America” during the street protests in Marawi City (515 miles south of Manila) to demonstrate

²²⁹ "The responsible organs of the CPP must constantly study and arrange the personnel and methods for developing links with the rank and file as well as junior and middle-level officers of the military and police," Source: "Philippines: Communist Party Leaders Pledge To Stage 'Popular' Uprising," 26 December 2004, *ABS-CBN*, from FBIS reports (access 02/20/05)

²³⁰ Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, "Options in the Pursuit of Just, Comprehensive and Stable Peace in the Southern Philippines," *Asian Survey*, April 2001, Vol.41 No.2, 278-279

²³¹ "U.S. Civil Society Peace Group meets with Peace Team," 29 November 2004, *BusinessWorld*, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 12/13/04)

²³² Ibid.

against the bombing of Afghanistan.²³³ “Murad Ibrahim, a vice chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), warned the attacks on Afghanistan...would make more Filipino Moslems sympathetic with the Taliban and bin Laden.”²³⁴ According to Murad, the MILF had taken a “wait and see” attitude regarding the war in Afghanistan. He warned, however, that the MILF is not in a position to stop any Muslim fanatic who might conduct retaliatory acts against American interests in the Philippines.²³⁵ Another report stated:

In a Muslim-dominated region of the Philippines, about 5,000 protesters chanted ‘Death to America’ and ‘Long live Osama bin Laden’ as they burned American flags and a picture of Bush. Muslim leaders in the city of Marawi warned Americans in the region that they were not safe.²³⁶

It is not clear whether the MNLF or the MILF were involved in organizing these demonstrations. The Filipino Muslim (Moro) anti-war protests held in front of the U.S. Embassy in Manila in October 2001 appear to have been organized by “national democratic” leftist groups.²³⁷ The NDF is known to have created a Moro Revolutionary Organization (MRO) which it described as an “underground organization of the Moro people in Mindanao, southern Philippines.”²³⁸

D. LEFTIST NATIONALISM IN THAILAND

After the coup of 1976 and the rightists’ attacks on the left-wing National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT) organized demonstrations at Thammasat University, no major organization or civil society group identified itself openly with the left. The NSCT was severely weakened after many of its members fled to the countryside or abroad.

²³³ “Thousands of Philippine Moslems rally against U.S. attacks,” 9 October 2001, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, from Lexis-Nexis database (02/26/05)

²³⁴ “Thousands of Philippine Moslems rally against U.S. attacks”

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Chris Fontaine, “Protests against U.S.-led attacks continue as allies pledge support,” 9 October 2001, The Associated Press, from Lexis-Nexis database (12/13/04)

²³⁷ “Protest actions against war of aggression and reaction continue in the Philippines,” October 2001, *Ang Bayan* (official newspaper of the CPP), 5, from the internet: <http://www.philippinerevolution.org/cgi-bin/archive/archive.pl> (accessed 11/24/04)

²³⁸ “What is the NDF?” from the internet: <http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/fil/ndf.html> (accessed 12/11/04)

With its leaders in jail, the student organization splintered into smaller groups.²³⁹ The official death toll of the rightists attack against the student demonstration at Thammasat University on 6 October 1976 was placed at forty-one, and another 3,000 students were detained by the police and the military.²⁴⁰ Eighteen of the top leaders of the NSCT were charged with treason, *lese-majeste*, communist activities, and attempted murder.²⁴¹ Liberal democracy suffered a serious reversal in Thailand after the coup of 1976, and the rural communist movement incurred a short-term gain as a result of the influx of city students fleeing from right-wing vigilante groups and the government security forces.

In addition to the legacies of the 1976 military crackdown, the left as an ideological force was shattered by the disillusionment of the students with their rough experience in the Communist Party of Thailand and the collapse of international communism after the Cold War.²⁴² As a result, the left as a political movement was overtly absent in the May 1992 popular uprising that overthrew the military regime installed by the coup of 1991 - former 1970s student radicals participated as individuals in the people power revolt.²⁴³ According to Giles Ungpakorn, an avowed Marxist and a political science professor at Chulalongkorn University, the major forces that drove reform during the period after the 1992 revolt can be divided into two conflicting class factions: the “people faction” and the “liberal business faction.”²⁴⁴ He also suggested

²³⁹ “Thai Government confiscates funds of Student Organization,” 31 May 1984, *Japan Economic Newswire*, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/19/05). According to Nithinand Yorsaengrat, the student movement had split as early as 1973 after the “people power revolt” that toppled the Thanom dictatorship. The students groups had differences on the role of the movement during the budding democracy between 1973 and 1976. The National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT) and the Federation of Independent Students of Thailand (FIST) were the major contenders during this split. Source: Nithinand Yorsaengrat, “100 FIRST: Social Unrest (Chapter 91),” 30 January 2005, *The Nation*, from the internet: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview.php?clid=26&id=111514&usrssess=> (accessed 02/20/05)

²⁴⁰ Ibid. The casualties were probably higher according to Thongchai Winichakul, a former student leader of the NSCT who is now a faculty member of Southeast Asia Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Source: Thongchai Winichakul, “We Do Not Forget the 6 October,” from the internet: <http://www.2519.net/newweb/doc/englisharticle/we.doc> (accessed 02/21/05). Paper was presented at the workshop on “Imagining the Past, Remembering the Future” Cebu City, Philippines, 8-10 March 2001

²⁴¹ Yorsaengrat

²⁴² Ji Ungpakorn, “October 1976 massacre led to post-May 1992 reform,” 6 October 2001, *The Nation*, from the internet: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/page.arcview.php3?clid=11&id=49382&usrssess=1> (accessed 02/25/04)

²⁴³ Ungpakorn, “October 1976 massacre...” See also Winichakul, “We Do Not Forget the 6 October”

²⁴⁴ Ungpakorn, “October 1976 massacre”

that class struggle in Thailand took the form of “civil-society” (interest groups) competing for influence against the state, the role once played by the leftist parties like the Socialist Party, the Socialist United Front, and the New Force (*Palang mai*).²⁴⁵ If this was the case, it may explain why the opposition to American military forward presence in Thailand in 2001 took the form of influential lobby blocs within the Thai Rak Thai government and the opposition representatives in the parliament, and the seeming lack of identifiable left-wing groups protesting – a sharp contrast to the Philippine situation.²⁴⁶ As democracy continues to mature in Thailand, the budding elements on the left may calibrate their activities according to the tolerance of the expanding democratic space.

In 2003, the anti-U.S. demonstrations conducted by secular groups were planned mainly by academics (faculty members and student leaders) from major universities in Bangkok. It was led by a newly formed umbrella group of twelve NGOs called the “People’s Globalisation Network for Peace” whose activists condemned the American war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.²⁴⁷ In addition these groups also opposed the bilateral agreement of the U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Area (FTA). The protest planned for 17 October 2003 had a small number of estimated participants, mainly students and artists belonging to the Student Federation of Thailand and the Association of Artists for Peace.²⁴⁸ The Workers’ Democracy Group led by Giles Ungpakorn planned to join the peace march of the student activists. The venue of the demonstration was set at the same route used by student activists in 1976 who protested against the American military bases in Thailand.²⁴⁹ The political Left in Thailand has the capacity to keep the anti-American agenda alive, but it currently does not have the mass following to mount large demonstrations such as those seen in the 1970s. Political activists in

²⁴⁵ See Girling, 197-200 for description of leftist parties and their activities between 1974 and 1976.

²⁴⁶ Some of the politicians who raised the issue of American use of U-Tapao were Democrat party member Ongart Klampaiboon and opposition leader Chuan Leekpai. Source: “U-Tapao ‘not used for U.S. strikes,’” 12 October 2001, *The Nation*, from the internet: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/page.arcview.php3?clid=2&id=49678&usrsess=1> (accessed 02/25/04) Long-time supporters of PM Thaksin like Dr. Prawes Vasri and Dr Sem Pringpuangkaew were among those who warned him not to allow the United States to use the U-tapao airbase to conduct the war in Aghanistan in 2001. Source: “Thaksin advised to shun U.S.,” 5 November 2001, *The Nation*, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/21/05)

²⁴⁷ Kultida Samabuddhi and Pradit Ruangdit, “Activists told to shift venue of protest to aid security,” 15 October 2003, *Bangkok Post*, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/21/05)

²⁴⁸ Samabuddhi and Ruangdit, “Activists told to shift venue”

²⁴⁹ Samabuddhi and Ruangdit, “Activists told to shift venue.”

Thailand lamented on the difference of their government's tolerance of protesters in comparison to the Philippines' more lenient atmosphere. Furthermore, Thai observers noted the vibrancy of civil society in the Philippines in sharp contrast to Thailand:

The protest in the Philippines last week appeared to be more radical and involved a much larger number of protesters. Some 7,000 students and other demonstrators took to the streets and burned US [sic] flags while trying to march on the Philippine House of Representatives...Protesters included some legislators who unfurled anti-war banners before walking out in protest during Bush's speech.²⁵⁰ The Philippine civil society movement seems to have earned state recognition from its long history of struggle against colonialism and, in recent times, dictatorship and corruption.²⁵¹

E. MUSLIM POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN THAILAND AFTER 9/11

The American military forward presence in Thailand remains controversial not only because of its past effects on civil-military relations. President Bush's declaration of war against terrorism after 11 September 2001 triggered a negative response from the Thai Muslims who perceived his proclamation as anti-Islamic. Prime Minister Thaksin's government was under extreme pressure during this period because of President Bush's policy statement that "if you are not with us, then you are against us." Caught between a "rock and a hard place," the Thai government's dilemma became painfully obvious after Muslim groups from southern Thailand petitioned the prime minister to oppose the United States' attack on Afghanistan.

The Thai government and the public sensitivity to American military access during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) reflected their concern for the opinion of the Thai Muslims in the provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla, Pattani, Satun, Chang Mai, and Chang Rai. Prior to the start of the OEF, eight Islamic groups sent a letter to Prime Minister Thaksin to express their opposition to the deployment of Thai troops into Afghanistan. Similar concerns were voiced against allowing American military forces to use Thai military bases. The Muslim groups were composed of moderate or mainstream Islamic NGOs like the Council of Muslim Thai Organization,

²⁵⁰ "Learning a lesson from Filipinos," 26 October 2003, *The Nation* (Thailand), from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/26/05)

²⁵¹ Ibid.

the Foundation for Islamic Centres of Thailand, Muslim Media Association, Muslim Youth of Thailand Association, Thai Muslim Students Association, Thai Pakistan Friendship Association, Muslim Lawyers Club and the Siam Muslim Club.²⁵² The Thai government was careful not to alienate the Thai Muslims because it could fan the flames of Muslim insurgent groups like the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO). Even before receiving the letter from the Muslim NGOs, Prime Minister Thaksin appealed to the Islamic community to be wary of “People with ill intentions [who] are trying to stir this [Afghan war] up into a religious issue.”²⁵³

Thailand’s Prime Minister was in a quandary after President Bush’s speech to the American Congress declared, “Either you are with us, or you’re with the terrorists.”²⁵⁴ Thailand wanted to support the United States but at the same time to prevent the alienation of its Muslim minority. As of 24 September 2001 “Thaksin has said Thailand will back America’s war on global terrorism, but the government has denied speculation that [the] U-Tapao Air base might be used as a staging area for US forces.”²⁵⁵ PM Thaksin’s Office Minister Thamarak Isarangura “ruled out the possibility that the United States would use Thailand as a base to launch retaliatory strikes on countries that harbour terrorists”.²⁵⁶ The Defense Minister and other military officials likewise issued vague references to Thailand’s policy regarding American military forward presence at U-tapao, sometimes alluding to the annual COBRA GOLD combined exercises.

The Thai Muslims’ concern with American forward presence in Thailand during the war in Afghanistan in 2001 took the form of influential voices in the parliament such as Surin Pitsuwan, a former foreign minister who is also a Muslim. He supported the idea of allowing the United States to use Utapao as a logistics base, but he also said the government must be sensitive to the feelings of the Muslims in the country.²⁵⁷ Surin

²⁵² “Letter to Thaksin: Muslim NGOs oppose aid for US operations,” *The Nation*, 27 September 2001. The Nation website (accessed 2/25/04)

²⁵³ “PM seeks to reassure Muslims.” *The Nation*, 24 September 2001. The Nation website (accessed 2/25/04)

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 2

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 1

²⁵⁶ *The Nation*, 24 September 2001. The Nation website (accessed 2/25/04), 1

²⁵⁷ “MILITARY STRIKES: Proof a must for support,” 24 September 2001, *The Nation* (Thailand), from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/26/05)

Pitsuwan was also critical of the Thai government for not being candid about the nature of the American military forward presence during that period. He alleged that the government lied to the Muslim leader Chularajmontri Sawas Sumalayasak that the U.S. aircraft used the base at Utapao for “routine” refueling stops and not for warplanes headed to attack Afghanistan.²⁵⁸ Thai Muslims in the southern provinces opposed the American bombing of Afghanistan and urged a nationwide boycott of products made in the United States.²⁵⁹

Muslim groups in the four provinces in the south were able to mobilize large anti-war demonstrations during this period. In Yala alone, about 10,000 participated in a rally denouncing the U.S. military action and called for a boycott of American goods.²⁶⁰ The provincial Muslim committees in southern Thailand sent representatives to Prime Minister Thaksin to clarify the nature of the American military use of the U-Tapao naval airbases.²⁶¹ Of the 50,000 Muslims in the northern province of Chiang Mai, about 1,000 to 3,000 were expected to join protests similar to those organized in the south.²⁶² The aftermath of 9/11 and the United States declaration of war on the Taliban and *Al Qaeda* had energized the Muslim constituencies in both the southern and the northern provinces of Thailand. Thai Muslims’ reaction to the American military presence in their country took the form of peaceful protests, rallies, and boycott of American-made goods. The political mobilization of Muslims in the southern provinces may have sparked the revival of the symbols and idioms of religious fundamentalism that added a new twist to the Malay ethnic nationalism. The recent Islamization of the Muslim identity, the policy

²⁵⁸ “USE OF U-TAPAO BASE: Government lied – Surin,” 18 October 2001, *The Nation* (Thailand), from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/26/05)

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Temsak Traisophon and Nujaree Raekroom, “Security stepped up in South ahead of major Muslim gatherings 21 Oct,” 16 October 2001, *Bangkok Post* (internet version), from the Lexis-Nexis database (02/26/05)

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² “Thai Muslims urge US to halt strikes before Ramadan; to protest in North 19 Oct,” 17 October 2001, *Bangkok Post* (internet version), from the Lexis-Nexis database (02/26/05) See also Subin Kheunkaew, “Security beefed up in Chiang Mai ahead of protest at US, UK consulates,” 19 October 2001, *Bangkok Post* (internet version), from the Lexis-Nexis database (02/26/05)

failures of the current Thai administration and the dismal quality of conflict management had exacerbated the simmering insurgency in recent years since 2001.²⁶³

²⁶³ Aurel Croissant, "Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences Since-2001," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 1/2005 (forthcoming)

IV. RATIONALE OF THE ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS OF GROUPS OPPOSED TO U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

While it cannot be discounted that opposition groups have genuine concerns about the negative impact of American military presence on security and sovereignty of the Philippines and Thailand, some of these groups also have a self-interest that could be jeopardized by this presence. For example, the military assistance and counter-terrorist training received by the AFP from the United States to fight the *Al Qaeda* linked *Abu Sayyaf* could also be used to stem the CPP-NPA revolutionary armed struggle. The CPP and the NPA's concern became more pronounced after the U.S. State Department included their group in the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) in 2002.

A. LEFTIST-NATIONALIST RATIONALE IN THE PHILIPPINES

Perhaps the loss of sovereignty is the foremost issue in the minds of the leftist opposition to American military forward presence. The arguments of the left are often couched in historical terms, as previously discussed in Chapter II. A critic of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) described it as "...a neo-colonial document that makes a mockery of Philippine sovereignty."²⁶⁴ It is noteworthy that spokespersons of nationalistic groups would sometimes arrogate the position of the Filipino majority as compatible with their point of view, for example:

This US-imposed agreement was opposed and continues to be opposed by the vast majority of the Filipino people.²⁶⁵

The Filipino people reject the VFA because of its one-sided, unequal, unjust, onerous and deceptive provisions. It has been described by the very influential Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) as "an agreement between a master and a lackey."²⁶⁶

²⁶⁴ Danilo P. Vizmanos, "The People's Struggle Against Foreign Military Presence in the Philippines," 26 June 1999, speech delivered to the Conference on Military Bases held at Seoul, South Korea, Vizmanos is a retired Philippine Navy Captain and was a former Inspector General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. From the internet: <http://www.yonip.com/main/articles/struggle.html> (accessed 02/27/05)

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Vizmanos, "The Struggle Against Foreign Military Presence"

These claims are discounted by surveys conducted by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) between 2 June and 16 June 1999. The results being a majority 55 percent of Filipinos agreed with the Philippine Senate approval of the Visiting Forces Agreement.²⁶⁷ “The nationwide SWS survey found 23 percent disagreement with the Senate approval of VFA, and 18 percent undecided.”²⁶⁸ Furthermore, a plurality of 43 percent believe that the Philippines has the final say on the length of stay and the number of American forces that can visit the country.²⁶⁹ Only one-fourth (23 percent) do not believe the Philippines has this discretion.²⁷⁰ Majority of those surveyed (59 percent) believe that the United States military will aid the Philippines in the event of an armed conflict with China over the Spratlys.²⁷¹

The Philippine public perception differed from the American policy reiterating Washington’s neutrality towards competing claims in the Spratly disputes. As a matter of policy, the United States has rejected the periodic Philippine overtures to link its Spratly claims with the Article Five of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty.²⁷² According to Shannon Tow, the multilateral and bilateral exercises conducted by the United States with allies in the region had strengthened the credibility of the United States as a dominant maritime power in Southeast Asia.²⁷³ This could account for the positive responses to the surveys conducted in the Philippines.

The “silent majority” of public opinion spoke through these surveys, although the Filipino critics made a louder noise in both domestic and international protest events. It is important to keep this in perspective when conducting public diplomacy in future military forward presence.

²⁶⁷ “Majority Agree with VFA, Expect U.S. Military Help in case of Spratly Conflict – SWS Survey,” 18 August 1999, from the internet: www.sws.org.ph/pr_81899.htm (accessed 02/28/05)

²⁶⁸ Ibid. “The June 1999 SWS survey used a statistically-representative national sample of 1,200 adults, for an error margin of plus or minus 3%,” according to the Social Weather Station.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Shannon Tow, “Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. strategic balance,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26, no.3 (2004), from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/04/05)

²⁷³ Ibid.

A second rationale is the constitutional restrictions regarding the presence of foreign military forces and bases without a treaty approved by the Philippine Senate. Several center-left politicians filed a petition in the Philippine Supreme Court to have the VFA declared “unconstitutional.”²⁷⁴ Since the expiration of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991, there has been no new treaty that would allow the return of American forces, according to their argument. The petition cited Section XVIII, Article 25 of the Philippine Constitution to support their case.²⁷⁵ Among other things, the petition also stated that the VFA is void because it allows the violation of the constitution’s provision against nuclear weapons (Article II, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution). The American military’s policy is to “neither confirm nor deny” the presence of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. military aircraft or naval vessels.²⁷⁶

The June 1999 survey also found that a plurality of 42 percent of Filipinos believe that the U.S. will voluntarily follow the Philippine constitutional ban on nuclear arms. Over one-fourth (28 percent) do not believe that the U.S. will comply with the ban, and the rest are undecided.²⁷⁷

This issue of neither confirming nor denying nuclear capability of American forces remains controversial because it conflicts with the provision against nuclear weapons in the Philippine Constitution. The incompatibility of these two policies is likely to be exploited by the critics of the VFA.

Third, leftist critics denounced the surrender of Philippine jurisdiction over incidents involving American military personnel participating in the combined military exercises. In the same petition submitted to the Philippine Supreme Court, the petitioners

²⁷⁴ “Supreme Court Petition on the Visiting Forces Agreement (1999),” 4 June 1999, from the internet: <http://www.yonip.com/main/articles/court.html> (accessed 02/27/05)

²⁷⁵ “Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, FOREIGN MILITARY BASES, TROOPS, OR FACILITIES SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED IN THE PHILIPPINES EXCEPT UNDER A TREATY DULY CONCURRED IN BY THE SENATE and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, AND RECOGNIZED AS A TREATY BY THE OTHER CONTRACTING STATE.” [All CAPS from original source] Source: From the Supreme Court Petition on the VFA

²⁷⁶ Department of the Navy, “RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ON NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF U.S. FORCES,” 29 March 1993, OPNAVINST 5721.1E, Memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

²⁷⁷ “Majority Agree with VFA, Expect U.S. Military Help in case of Spratly Conflict – SWS Survey,” 18 August 1999, from the internet: www.sws.org.ph/pr_81899.htm (accessed 02/28/05)

questioned the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement related to the criminal jurisdiction issue. Philippine Supreme Court judges ruled 11-3 and issued a statement, “It is the Court’s considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution ...”²⁷⁸

The VFA allows the US [sic] total jurisdiction over crimes committed by US personnel while in the Philippines. It compels the Philippines to “waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction (over all offenses committed by US troops) upon request by the US except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. The Philippines also agreed to waive claims on damages to the environment, destructions caused by the activities of the VFA.”²⁷⁹

This portion of the Visiting Forces Agreement is likely to revive the motif of the “unequal treaties” argument. A motor vehicle accident in Zamboanga allegedly involving four drunken American soldiers during the *Bayanihan* 2003 military exercises raised attention to this issue.²⁸⁰

A fourth rationale, Filipino leftists opposed the U.S. military presence because it could potentially involve the Philippines in American conflicts with third parties or neighboring states. During the Cold War, Filipino critics argued that the presence of American military bases in the Philippine could be a magnet for a Soviet nuclear strike or counter-strike. This fear was not totally unfounded because a declassified 1958 U.S. State Department memo cited the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) that China and its Soviet ally may retaliate against the 7th Fleet Headquarters (then located at Subic Bay Naval Base) if the United States use nuclear weapons in a limited war in the Far East.²⁸¹ Current discussions include statements that the Philippines is likely to be targeted by more terrorist attacks because of the United States designation as a “Major

²⁷⁸ Cecille S. Visto, “Supreme Court upholds VFA,” 11 September 2000, *Business World*, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/02/05)

²⁷⁹ Asis, “The Philippine SOFA”

²⁸⁰ Carina I. Roncesvalles, “Traffic Accident to Test R.P.-U.S. Military Agreement,” 25 September 2003, *Business World (Philippines)*, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/27/05)

²⁸¹ U.S. Department of State, “August 14 Discussion of Taiwan Straits,” Memorandum for Mr. Christian A. Herter, Jr. from Gerard C. Smith, S/P -58231-3A, 13 August 1958, National Security Archives, from the internet: http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/cgi-bin/cqcggi?CQ_SESSION_KEY=YNAIJHLZVZZQ&CQ_DTF_CAT_ITEMS=1&CQDOC=1&CQ_QUERY_HANDLE=127027 (accessed 12/12/04)

Non-NATO Ally.” Other scenarios cited are the potential involvement of the Philippines in the event of a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, or a war in the Korean Peninsula.²⁸²

The past American support given to President Marcos’ authoritarian regime germinated another reason for opposing the U.S. military bases. This rationale was one of the dominant themes in the mid-late 1980s and may have been the catalyst of the nationalistic milieu during that period. According to Gregor and Aganon:

The United States was understood to have created the “Marcos dictatorship” or at least to have perpetuated it through direct and indirect support. As early as 1975, Lorenzo Tanada and Jose Diokno arranged to have published, under the imprimatur of the Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines, an account of human rights violations that attributed the very existence of the Marcos government to Washington’s efforts “to protect the privileged position of foreign and domestic capital and the interest of the U.S. government.”²⁸³

This issue no longer holds sway, probably because of the generation change and the different role played by the United States in preventing the right-wing movement from taking power in the RAM’s 1989 coup attempt. A rightist military government could have re-imposed authoritarian rule fifteen years ago. Even the political left is acutely aware of this, although it would not acknowledge the positive role of the U.S. military in preventing a rightist take-over.

After the American intervention to save the Aquino administration from the military coup, right-wing groups began to actively support the anti-bases protest that was pioneered by the left. “In her weekly radio program May 6 [1990], President Corazon Aquino warned that military dissidents who have staged several unsuccessful coups against her government may soon join forces with communist rebels.”²⁸⁴ She made this comment after seeing a widely circulated photograph showing a well-known dissident military officer was raising his fist (Marxist style) in a protest and shouting “revolution.”

²⁸² “Desperate for the VFA,” 13 May 1999, *Business World (Philippines)*, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 11/23/04)

²⁸³ A. James Gregor and Virgilio Aganon, *The Philippine Bases: U.S. Security at Risk* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1987), 56-57. Authors cited quotation from *The State of the Nation After Three Years of Martial Law, September, 21, 1975* (San Francisco: Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines, 1976), 24-25

²⁸⁴ Ramon Isberto, “Philippines: Rebels from Left and Right Converging?” 8 May 1990, *Inter Press Service*, from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/05/05)

B. RIGHTIST-NATIONALIST REASONING IN THE PHILIPPINES

Unlike the leftist groups, the rationales related to the jurisdiction issue over American personnel and the past American support of the Marcos authoritarian regime was not enunciated by right-wing groups. However, rightist elements - especially the YOU - voiced similar concerns as the leftist groups with regards to the sovereignty issue. Less than a year after the most dangerous right-wing coup attempt against the Corazon Aquino government, the Young Officers' Union and its allied organizations in a previously unknown Democratic Front for Filipinism (DFF) issued a statement serving "Notice of Termination of the R.P.-U.S. Military Agreement" on 1 September 1990. It stated, "The continued existence of foreign military bases or facilities in the Philippines violates Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity, and an impediment to the full exercise of the sovereign Filipino people's complete freedom."²⁸⁵ The right-wing movement was miffed at the U.S. military intervention that thwarted their coup. If the 1989 coup d'état had succeeded, it could have reversed the democratization and ended the nascent democracy. The frustration resulting from the failure of the 1989 coup added to the right-wing movement's list of complaints against the presence of the American military bases. The RAM criticized the presence of the U.S. bases; in contrast, the YOU demanded their closure and removal.

As in the case of the leftist groups, the right-wing nationalist movement also cited the provision, of Article XVIII, Section 25 of the constitution, against nuclear weapons as the justification for the closure of the U.S. military bases in 1991.²⁸⁶ The DFF also stated one of their objectives in a manifesto as "in fulfillment of the sovereign Filipino people's commitment in making Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality"²⁸⁷

Like the left, right-wing groups also fear the potential involvement of the Philippines in American conflicts with third parties or neighboring states. The Young Officers' Union and the DFF wanted the Philippines to pursue non-alignment and

²⁸⁵ "DFF [Democratic Front For Filipinism] Statement on RP-US Military Bases Agreement," 1 September 1990, cited as Appendix A-10 from *Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy*, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (Manila: Recon Press, 1990), 191-193 The Young Officers' Union (YOU) was a member of this elusive political front.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ *Kudeta*, 191-193

neutrality as a foreign policy. It criticized the U.S. bases in 1990 as not primarily for the defense of the Philippines, but as forward defense bases against American adversaries, namely, the People's Republic of China and the former Soviet Union.²⁸⁸ The views of former members of right-wing organizations like the RAM would change after the PRC take-over of the Philippine claimed Mischief Reef (Spratlys) in 1995. By 2000, some members of RAM including its former leader Gringo Honasan (a Philippine Senator by that time) supported the renewal of ties with the United States through the Visiting Forces Agreement. Honasan voted in the Senate in favor of the ratification of the VFA.²⁸⁹ Honasan stated, "We have no choice. We cannot afford to remain neutral. Prudent alliances are our only option."²⁹⁰ Nationalistic idealism gave way to *realpolitik* as a result of the recognition that the United States can play the role of balancer against an aggressive China.

C. MUSLIM OPINION IN THE PHILIPPINES

Rationales (1) to (6) and (8) do not apply to Muslims in the Philippines. Filipino Muslims were sensitive to the American Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) because it was perceived as anti-Islamic. The response of Muslims in Mindanao to the GWOT was mixed at best. Initially, the pronouncement of the American government immediately after 9/11 was perceived differently in Muslim countries, including Muslim areas in Mindanao. Poor choices of words like "Islamic terrorism" cast a wide net that included everyone who believes in the tenets of the Muslim faith. Furthermore, the new visa and immigration restrictions applied to Muslim countries further exacerbated these perceptions.²⁹¹ The wars on Afghanistan and Iraq have been the focus of anti-American agitators in Mindanao. Protest issues now include the expansion of the U.S.-R.P. *Balikatan* exercises to other areas in Mindanao. The MILF claimed "...that more than

²⁸⁸ See the "Statement of Oneness with the Stated Ideals and Vision of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., "1 March 1990, from the Young Officers Union and allied organizations. Source: *Kudeta*, 194-195

²⁸⁹ Martin P. Marfil and others, "Philippine Senate Ratifies VFA," 28 May 1999, *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (Internet version), from FBIS reports (accessed 03/04/05)

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Satu P. Limaye, "Minding the gaps: the Bush administration and U.S.-Southeast Asia relations," 1 April 2004, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26, no. 1 (2004)

11,000 held rallies in North Cotabato accusing the US [sic] of orchestrating wars on the island that resulted in the death of thousands and destroying billions of pesos worth of properties.”²⁹² Militant civil society groups in Cotabato also blamed the United States for “underwriting” former President Marcos’ war in Mindanao “that resulted in 50,000 killed, (displacement of) two million refugees, 200,000 houses destroyed, 535 mosques burned, and 200 schools demolished.”²⁹³ Although the participants of these protests were mainly Muslims, there is a distinct possibility that NDF groups may be involved in the political mobilization and agitation-propaganda to spin the issues.

Muslim leaders who supported the American exercises did so because they generated business for local traders and small enterprises in other areas where the U.S. military had been in the past, e.g., Zamboanga City. The city council at General Santos City voted 100 percent in favor the military exercises and stated that it is within the scope of the Visiting Forces Agreement signed by both countries.²⁹⁴ Business enterprises in the city of General Santos experienced a boom in the early 1990s as a result of a program funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.²⁹⁵ This was not related to the VFA or the *Balikatan* military exercises. However, the positive results of other American supported programs certainly contributed to the acceptance of the U.S. military presence in those areas.

D. LEFTIST-NATIONALIST REASONING IN THAILAND

The leftist rationale of “loss of sovereignty” does not carry as much weight as it used to be in the 1970s (see Chapter II). It occasionally surfaces when American forces in large numbers appear at major Thai military bases as, for example, during the recent tsunami relief operations conducted out of Utapao naval airbase. Although the current

²⁹² “Military Exercises in N. Cotabato Draw Criticism, Kudos.” 28 July 2004, *Business World*, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 02/13/05)

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ The Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) included an asparagus farming project that generated jobs and income for 489 farmers in the region through contract schemes between the local producers and seven multi-national companies. As a result, the income of these farmers multiplied three times. Source: “New Investments Help Alleviate Philippine Rural Poverty,” 19 February 1997, *Asia Pulse*, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/05/05)

discourse may not come from leftist sources, the rationale reflects similarities to the arguments of the NSCT in the 70s. For example, Siri-anya an editorial columnist at the *Bangkok Phuchatkan* (a business daily published in Thai) stated, “...the United States has used the Thailand's U-Taphao military base and moved troops and some equipment there on the pretext that the base serves as the regional disaster relief center.”²⁹⁶ Siri-anya continued, “America has succeeded in its designs for the base. It is up to patriots and academics to answer if Thailand has lost pieces of its territory and part of its national sovereignty and independence.”²⁹⁷

Interestingly enough, Thai right-wing groups in the 1970s articulated the sovereignty issue to justify their support for the American military presence. For the rightist movement, the presence of the American forces in Thailand served as a bulwark against the external threat of communism that could have overturned Thailand's sovereignty. The fall of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam to the communist in 1975 was followed by the American military withdrawal from Thailand that began in March 1976.²⁹⁸ The U.S. military drawdown at a time when the “dominoes” were falling in Indochina did not augur well for the Thai conservative elite and its allies in the right-wing movement. The resulting panic set-off the rightists' attacks at Thammasat University in October 1976.

The return of democracy to Thailand strengthened the authority of civilian rule over the military. Unlike in the past when the incumbent governments were dominated by authoritarian military figures, the politics of today involve the process of electoral democracy and not coups. It would be difficult for any opposition group to use the rationale of the “negative effects on civil-military relations” to argue against American military presence as a potential contributing factor to the degradation of civilian rule and democracy. If anything is to be learned from history, the most acute phase of anti-American sentiments in both Thailand and the Philippines was during the period of

²⁹⁶ Siri-anya, “They come with tsunami,” 14 January 2005, *Bangkok Phuchatkan*, from FBIS database (accessed 03/05/05)

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ “Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Thailand: Ways to Improve Future Withdrawal Operations,” Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States, 1 November 1977, United States General Accounting Office (Unclassified version of GAO's SECRET report LCD-77-402 dated 3 June 1977), 5

democratic transition after an authoritarian regime that were underwritten by the United States collapsed. These downfalls were preceded or followed by serious economic crises, e.g., the recession in Thailand from the ripple effect of the Arab oil embargo. The combination of newly found freedoms and rising expectations frustrated by the slow rate of economic improvement after the transition to democracy may have heightened the feelings of discontent after 1973.²⁹⁹

The arguments against granting access to logistics facilities to U.S. forces during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM cited the parallels of Thai involvement in the Vietnam conflict at the urging of the United States. Bases in Thailand were used in the past as staging areas for strike missions to bomb Hanoi.³⁰⁰ Similarly, some Thais expressed concern that bases like Utapao might be used for a similar purpose against Afghanistan in 2001 (see Muslim sentiments below).

E. MUSLIM SENTIMENTS IN THAILAND

The backdrop of Thai Muslim perceptions of the GWOT has similarities with its counterparts in the Philippines (see previous Section C in this chapter). In addition, one of the major reasons why Muslims in Thailand opposed the presence of American forces in their country in 2001 was the potential use of bases there to launch direct strikes in Afghanistan. Muslims in southern Thailand also expressed their opposition to sending Thai soldiers to support that war. “Eight Islamic groups tell PM [Thaksin] they are against sending troops or allowing the United States to use Thai military bases.”³⁰¹

The Thai government was concerned with the escalation of the Muslim insurgency that could result from the American forward deployments perceived to be related to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Prior to the start of OEF, the United States requested the support of key allies including Thailand in providing bases or facilities to support the war in Afghanistan. The

²⁹⁹ See James C. Davies, “Towards a Theory of Revolution,” *American Sociological Review* 27 (1962): 5-18

³⁰⁰ See Glasser, *The Secret Vietnam War*

³⁰¹ “LETTER TO THAKSIN: Muslim NGOs oppose aid for US operations,” 27 September 2001, *The Nation* (Bangkok), from Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/06/05)

Thai government response was ambivalent because of its concern for the sentiments of the Muslim Thais in the southern provinces. There was a latent, but simmering Muslim insurgency in the south that could be inflamed if the Thai government and military consents to the American request for access to logistics facilities in Thailand. The simultaneous and contradictory statements of Thai government and military officials were a symptom of this ambivalence.³⁰²

Dr. Panitan Wattanayakorn, a lecturer at the Chulalongkorn University's Faculty of Political Science, said that, "Its [Thai government] confusing and conflicting statements concerning the situation were understandable because it had to balance security obligations and domestic politics."³⁰³ (Underline added for emphasis). The government of Thailand was literally between a "rock and a hard place" because it cannot ignore its security relationship with the United States, but at the same time have to give consideration to the sentiments of its minority Muslim population in the south – who could easily be agitated by radical Islamic elements. The rash of terrorist attacks in southern Thailand in 2002 was a sign that Islamic radicalism was on the rise since the 9/11 attacks and the American response with a Global War on Terrorism.

³⁰² Sources showing the conflicting statements of Thai civilian and military officials: "US 'doesn't need bases,'" 24 September 2001, *The Nation* (Bangkok), from The Nation website (accessed 2/25/04), 1; See "US Military Strikes: Asean to be consulted on Thai airbases," 22 September 2001, *The Nation* (Bangkok), from The Nation website (accessed 2/25/04), 1; Panya Tewasangwan and Marissa Chimprabha, "US cleared to make use of U-Tapao," 10 October 2001, *The Nation* (Bangkok), from The Nation website (accessed 2/25/04); See also "U-Tapao 'not used for US strikes,'" 12 October 2001, *The Nation* (Bangkok), The Nation website (accessed 2/25/04); See article of Marissa Chimprabha, "Use of U-Tapao Base: Government lied – Surin," 18 October 2001, *The Nation* (Bangkok), from The Nation website (accessed 2/25/04), 1

³⁰³ Chimprabha, "Use of U-Tapao Base: Government lied – Surin"

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V. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

From the evidence gleaned from the Thai and Philippine histories, there have been conflicting sources of nationalism and their respective definitions of national interests that reflect the fluidity of the domestic politics especially during periods of economic crises and the political transitions into democratic regimes. The most salient anti-American sentiments were expressed during the early phase of democratic transition and consolidation. Harsh criticisms of U.S. military forward presence were contained by authoritarian rulers who benefited from the largesse of American economic and military aid. A return to democracy saw the resurgence of freedoms to articulate all kinds of grievances, including the criticisms against the American military presence.

These sentiments are comprehensible in a context in which American national security interests prevailed over those of its democratic ideals during a dangerous period of the Cold War. The United States succored the authoritarian regimes in order to gain access to forward military bases to confront the more insidious threat of communism. To put it in the simplest terms, American policies in Thailand and the Philippines during this period chose the lesser of two evils. Those policies reflect the pragmatism of *realpolitik* espoused by its distinguished proponents in the U.S. State Department like George F. Kennan:

We will have to dispense with all sentimentality and daydreaming. And our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world benefaction. We should cease to talk about vague, and for the Far East, unreal objectives, such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization. We should recognize that our influence in the Pacific and the Far Eastern World is absolutely vital to our security.³⁰⁴

The current American policy enunciated by the National Security Strategy of the United States (2002) is the complete opposite of the Cold War realism aptly articulated

³⁰⁴ George Kennan, "Review of Current Trends: U.S. Foreign Policy," 24 February 1948, excerpt in the *Containment : documents on American policy and strategy, 1945-1950*, ed. Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 226-228

by George Kennan. The authors of the NSS called for the “expansion of open societies and democracies” and the “promotion of global economic growth through free markets and trade.”³⁰⁵ As a consequence, American actions to achieve military forward presence will be gauged according to the professed values of U.S. national policy makers. The wanton use of economic and political leverage associated with the past may be distasteful to both the American public and the domestic public opinion in Thailand and the Philippines. The presence of democratic political institutions and processes in these countries introduces new challenges for American military planners and strategists because of intrinsic checks and balances that allow the articulation of the conflicting voices from various interest groups. In sharp contrast, the pro-American authoritarian regimes of the past had a small circle of decision makers.

The negative experience with the preceding American presence had damaged the “trust culture” in Thailand and the Philippines with respect to United States intentions related to access to base facilities. “Trust culture” is defined by Piotr Sztompka, a prominent sociologist, as “...a system of rules – norms and values – regulating granting trust and meeting, returning, and reciprocating trust; in short, rules about trust and trustworthiness.”³⁰⁶ The United States has recovered some of that trust, as evidenced by the major headway achieved by the bilateral relationship with both Thailand and the Philippines. These were manifest in the support given by both countries to the American war on terrorism.

Although not surprising, one of the major findings of this research is the revelation in detail of the groups that were and are working to damage or degrade the “trust culture” in these countries with regards to their relationship with the United States. The more radical elements of the opposition want to rekindle the image of America as an “imperialist power.” The unilateral action in Iraq did not help to cast off that impression.

This thesis has been able to identify the different sources and rationales of the opposition to the American military forward presence in Thailand and the Philippines. The rationales of the opposition groups can be summarized as follows:

³⁰⁵ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 1

³⁰⁶ Piotr Sztompka, *Trust: A Sociological Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 99

- (1) Loss of sovereignty.
- (2) Constitutional restrictions regarding the presence of foreign military forces and bases.
- (3) Negative effects on civil-military relations.
- (4) Jurisdiction issues over incidents involving American personnel.
- (5) Potential involvement in American conflicts with third parties or neighboring states.
- (6) Past American support of authoritarian or military regimes.
- (7) Sensitivity of Muslim minorities to the American Global War on Terrorism that is perceived as anti-Islamic.
- (8) Government concern for the escalation of the Thai Muslim insurgency that may result from American forward deployments perceived to be related to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

As previously mentioned in Chapter II, III and IV; Philippine and Thai groups and individuals cited reasons like defense against the threats of communist neighbors, and international terrorism, to support and justify the American military presence. In addition, the passage of the Visiting Forces Agreement in the Philippines Congress in 1999 was partly because of the perception that the United States serves as a balancer against China - the aftermath of the Mischief Reef incident in 1995. Other reasons in support of U.S. military presence mentioned the American assistance to improve the internal defenses against communist insurgencies and a right-wing coup attempt - as in the case of the Philippines in 1989. A Thai academic highlighted, in Chapter IV, the importance of balancing security obligations with domestic political considerations as a rationale why the Thai government may have accepted American military forward presence in 2001. Members of the military in both countries underlined the value of the assistance and training received from the United States as a result of the combined military exercises. Filipino Muslims in Mindanao who supported the American military presence cited the economic benefits corollary to the past *Balikatan* exercises. Furthermore, the creation of jobs and the economic development in areas of Mindanao due to programs initiated by other American agencies like the U.S. Agency for

International Development may have laid the groundwork for a more positive reception of the combined U.S.-R.P. military exercises.

A. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THAILAND, THE PHILIPPINES AND THE REGION

American military presence in Thailand and the Philippines will remain controversial, more so with the latter country. For this reason, the first “pure” RAND basing strategy listed in Chapter I (overseas main operating bases or MOBs) is not recommended for these two countries. The second and third “pure” basing strategy is the more likely scenario in the Southeast Asia region. To wit: identify one or more ‘reliable’ allies in the region and rely on them for future cooperation; and proliferation of security agreements to increase the number of potential allies in any given contingency.³⁰⁷

For these reasons, the United States has to explore different approaches to enhance the second and third RAND “pure” basing strategies and support them with a robust public diplomacy³⁰⁸ to restore the “trust culture” and mitigate the effects of the agents of “mistrust.” The following recommendations are in order:

(1) Because the specificity of military basing in the case of a contingent scenario will only have a deterrent effect if it is declared, the United States must be ready to open discussions with allies during the early phases of a crisis escalation in the region to achieve guaranteed access to facilities, not only for logistics assets but also for combat forces. This has to be negotiated through normal political channels (with executive approval and legislative concurrence) with the groundwork prepared by both the State and the Defense departments. In essence, the U.S. government has to request a treaty to satisfy the existing constitutional restrictions – in the case of the Philippines. The preparatory groundwork should include an aggressive public diplomacy with special emphasis on the potential impact of the crisis on regional security and balance of power.

³⁰⁷ Shlapak and others, eds, *A Global Access Strategy for the U.S. Air Force*, 92-93

³⁰⁸ See footnote 27

Emphasis on normal political channels meant that the domestic actors (members of the congress or parliament) in each country have to evaluate the situation and come to their own conclusions. Public diplomacy has to be geared to support the American position by presenting them as a part of a much broader regional security interest. The role of the State Department is crucial in elevating the issues at the multilateral forum in the region (the ASEAN Regional Forum) and the United Nations Security Council. This would bolster the credibility of American public diplomacy in both Thailand and the Philippines and negate charges of “U.S. imperialism” coming from the more radical opposition.

The existence of democratic space in both Thailand and the Philippines allows for the rational discussion of the issues involving all parties including the center-left and center-right representatives. The far left in the Philippines relies on nationalistic emotions and symbolism akin to fascist tactics used in Germany in the 1930s. It would be easier to rebuff and isolate the most radical opposition when the danger of a regional crisis becomes obvious even to leftist members of the legislatures.

If all else fails, the United States should consider terminating the ACSA or MLSA at a minimum or even the mutual defense treaties if the refusal to accept U.S. military presence causes grave harm to American national interests. This would placate all the allegations about “protection rackets” and “U.S. imperialism” in the context of a major regional crisis in Asia. There is evidence that the domestic public opinion in both countries recognized the value of reciprocity ingrained by the positive aspects of the relationship and role of the United States as a balancer in the region.

(2) On the counter-terrorism front, the involvement of American forces in direct combat or their presence during training exercises in the immediate areas of the insurgencies in both Thailand and the Philippines is not recommended. The shortcomings of the Thai government in handling the southern problem had already damaged the “trust culture” between Muslim and Buddhist Thais. Introducing a foreign element like the U.S. Special Forces will only further damage the “trust culture” considering the anti-American sentiments already prevalent in that region of Thailand. This is a problem that is internal to Thailand and can only be mitigated if the Thais

themselves ask for interlocutors acceptable to and trusted by Thai Muslims, i.e., intermediaries from Muslim countries like Malaysia or Indonesia.

The same is true with the current peace process between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). At the present time, Brunei and Malaysian troops serve as the buffer between the GRP military and the MILF rebels.³⁰⁹ American interest may be better served by non-military assistance to the peace process as envisioned by the economic assistance package and the role of NGOs like the United States Institute of Peace.

In the case of both Thailand and the Philippines, the respective governments have to address the root causes of the insurgencies and terrorism. Their independence in addressing those issues is a step towards strengthening the domestic “trust culture.” Philippine government and military officials are under attack by the CPP/NDF/NPA as “puppets of U.S. imperialism.” American diplomats and officials can seek the support of non-traditional, potential allies in domestic politics – center-left politicians – to implement programs addressing the “basic needs” issues in the Philippine Congress. These programs had been the grist of the U.S. Agency for International Development in Mindanao – as mentioned in the previous chapter. In addition, the American military and non-governmental organizations can assist a GRP-initiated program like “health care reform.” Political activists from the NDF attack the mournful state of the health care system without providing a solid program alternative to solve it – a tactic of revolutionary warfare to destroy the state’s credibility and the “trust culture.”

The U.S. military have years of experience in training medics and hospital corpsmen (and women) to handle basic medical needs at the platoon level. If the Philippine or Thai governments initiate a “community health program” to address the issues of preventive medical care at the grass-roots level, the U.S. military can incorporate its expertise to assist in the formation of “institutes of community health”

³⁰⁹ “OIC members Malaysia, Brunei and Libya have troops deployed on the island to monitor a ceasefire between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to help them find a political settlement to the decades-old separatist rebellion.” Source: Darwin T. Wee, “OIC assured talks with Muslim rebels on track despite clashes,” 11 February 2005, *BusinessWorld* (Philippines), from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/06/05)

similar to the “Naval School of Health Sciences.”³¹⁰ This form of assistance is different from previous Medical Civic Action Programs or MedCAPs because it would develop indigenous capacities and not dependency on outside support or foreign medical technology. The Peace Corps and *Medecins Sans Frontières* have similar programs. The drive for health care reform towards a “national health care system” is compatible with the ideology of left. Therefore, a counter-terrorist program that addresses basic community health needs will most likely be supported by center-left politicians in the Philippine Congress or even by the populist, but conservative Thai Rak Thai government in Thailand. The legislation of impartiality laws and the inculcation of neutrality as a part of values and norms of medical ethics in both countries will shield medical professionals and their assistants from attacks by extremists from both the left and the right. There were incidents in the past where doctors were assassinated by right-wing extremists or suspected security forces personnel because they treated NPA guerrillas with injuries. Impartiality laws and the ethics of neutrality should equally apply to military physicians and those serving in the Muslim insurgency zones in both Thailand and the Philippines.

American support for such a community health program will enhance the “trust culture” and give acceptability to reforms that would otherwise be rejected by the most conservative members of the parliament or the congress in these countries. The precedent set by the American military role during the tsunami relief efforts had set the tone for similar MOOTW activities under the aegis of counter-terrorism. The community health project in the Philippines and Thailand is a viable program for U.S.-PRC counter-terrorist cooperation because it is humanitarian in nature.

Military-to-military cooperation with the People’s Liberation Army is allowed by Public Law 106-65 Section 1201 if it involves humanitarian type of exercises (see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000).³¹¹ The People’s Republic of

³¹⁰ The Naval School of Health Sciences in San Diego, California have a program to train “Independent-Duty Corpsman,” from the internet: <http://nshssd.med.navy.mil/idc/index.htm> (accessed 03/06/05)

³¹¹ “Title XII: Matters Relating to Other Nations - Subtitle A: Matters Relating to the People’s Republic of China - Prohibits the Secretary from authorizing any military-to-military exchange or contact with the People’s Liberation Army of the Republic of China if such exchange or contact would create a national security risk. Makes such prohibition inapplicable to search and rescue or humanitarian exercises.” Source: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, from the internet: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:SN01059:@@D&summ2=m&> (accessed 3/14/05). See

China has a desire to be recognized as a responsible regional power in Asia. This was evidenced by the humanitarian assistance China extended to the Southeast Asia tsunami disaster areas. American engagement through this project could reinforce China's positive behavior and soften her belligerent attitude towards the United States at a time when the tensions across the Taiwan Straits are mounting. This is a project that could enhance the regional "trust culture" not only in Southeast Asia but also between the PRC and the United States. A combined humanitarian project is less vulnerable to criticisms from the domestic opposition in both Thailand and the Philippines.

(3) In consonance with the second and third RAND "pure" basing strategies, the United States should seek a proliferation of security agreements and alliances in the region that would include non-traditional partners like Indonesia and Malaysia. There were recent discussions of the renewal of the U.S. military training programs for Indonesia (cancelled 13 years ago) during the recent visit of Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono.³¹² The renewal of military ties with Indonesia should serve as a prelude to a deeper security relationship that would engender the "trust culture" among American friends in the region. A step in this direction would also help improve the chances of resolving the differences between Indonesia and the U.S. traditional ally, Australia. Both had strained relations since the 1999 Australian military intervention in East Timor.³¹³ A full restoration of military relationship with Indonesia would allow the TNI forces to join the combined military exercises of traditional American allies in the

also Shirley Kan, "U.S.-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy," 7 December 2004, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, from the internet: http://www.mipt.org/pdf/CRS_RS21995.pdf . Kan discusses the current counter-terrorism cooperation between the PRC and the United States. Shirley Kan's report did not mention any humanitarian missions or counter-terrorism cooperation between the U.S. military and the PLA at the present time. "Military-to-Military Contacts. While there has been no counter-terrorism cooperation with the PLA, the Pentagon has cautiously resumed military-to-military contacts with China, limited after the EP-3 crisis and subject to review by Secretary Rumsfeld. For the first time under the Bush Administration, the Pentagon and the PLA again held Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) on December 9, 2002. There were visits by China's Defense Minister, General Cao Gangchuan, in October 2003 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, in January 2004. The two militaries held another DCT round in February 2004. Congress has oversight of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65), which limited contacts with the PLA to prevent its 'inappropriate exposure' to operational areas." Source: Kan, 6

³¹² Jane Perlez, "Indonesia Welcomes U.S. Plan to Resume Training Its Military," 1 March 2005, *The New York Times*, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/06/05)

³¹³ "Australia cut links with Kopassus after the Indonesian military-backed violence in East Timor in 1999 left 1400 people dead." Source: Sian Powell, "U.S. Army to resume ties with Indonesia," 28 February 2005, *The Australian*, from Lexis-Nexis database (03/06/05)

region. The improvement of U.S.-Indonesian relationship could enhance the cooperation of other regional players (Malaysia) in supporting the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) that was proposed by Admiral Fargo in 2004. RMSI was envisioned to improve the cooperation of the littoral countries (Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) in protecting the Malacca Straits from potential terrorist attacks, piracy and drug trafficking. The proposition was opposed by Malaysia and Indonesia because the United States would send its naval special forces to patrol the straits. This was perceived as a potential violation of the sovereignty and jurisdiction over the littoral waters of the concerned states. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak said:

It is a sad fact that many of those who use the strait take it for granted. There are even those who forget that littoral states, each of them sovereign nations in their own right, have the ultimate say over the protection and preservation of the strait...Any assumption that its users have absolute freedom to utilize it including for military purposes reflect a lack of respect for the rights of littoral states and a misunderstanding of international law.³¹⁴

Formalizing the security alliances with Indonesia and Malaysia will not only enhance their cooperation with the RMSI, but also open the possibility of other options to Thailand and the Philippines in the event access to these places was denied.

(4) In addition to the U.S. military, American law enforcement agencies (FBI, DEA, etc.) and civilian institutions (think-tanks) can expand their relationships with counterparts in Thailand and the Philippines to deal with the problems of piracy, drug trafficking and terrorism. The reduction of military footprint in some areas could attenuate the sensitivities to American military presence.

(5) The proliferation of security agreements such as the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) has to be transparent. Because transparency reinforces the “trust culture” that is necessary for democracy to thrive in places like Thailand and the Philippines. It would be a pity to sacrifice democracy in one of these countries in the

³¹⁴ “U.S. says it has no ulterior motive for Malacca Strait,” 11 October 2004, *Japan Economic Newswire*, from the Lexis-Nexis database (accessed 03/06/05)

hopes of saving another one in Asia or elsewhere. As Piotr Sztompka once said, “It is not only that democracy engenders trust, but also, once in place, the culture of trust helps sustain democracy.”³¹⁵

³¹⁵ Sztompka, 146

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APPENDIX A: LIST OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (NDF) ALLIED ORGANIZATIONS³¹⁶

- (1) Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP-MLMZT), re-established along explicitly Maoist lines in 1968, provides the leadership in the Philippine revolution.
- (2) New People's Army (NPA), special mass organization of the CPP and principal armed force of the NDF.
- (3) Revolutionary Council of Trade Unions (RCTU), an alliance of revolutionary trade unions.
- (4) *Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid* (PKM), National Association of Peasants, including farm workers.
- (5) *Kabataang Makabayan* (KM), Patriotic Youth, and association of the youth and students.
- (6) *Makabayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan* (MAKIBAKA), Patriotic Movement of New Women, underground organization of women.
- (7) Cordillera People's Democratic Front (CPDF), an alliance of various indigenous peoples in the Cordillera region of Northern Luzon.
- (8) Christians for National Liberation (CNL), an underground organization of church and lay people.
- (9) *Katipunan ng mga Gurong Makabayan* (KAGUMA), Association of Patriotic Teachers, including educational workers.
- (10) *Katipunan ng mga Samahang Manggagawa* (KASAMA), Federation of Labor Organizations, also includes the semi-proletariat and the urban poor.
- (11) *Artista at Manunulat ng Sambayanan* (ARMAS), Artists and Writers for the People, a league of cultural activists, includes those in film, TV, radio.
- (12) *Makabayang Kawaning Pilipino* (MKP), underground organization of government employees.
- (13) *Makabayang Samahang Pangkalusugan* (MSP), Patriotic Health Association, for doctors, nurses, medical students, community health workers, etc.
- (14) *Liga ng Agham para sa Bayan* (LAB), League of Scientists for the people.
- (15) Moro Revolutionary Organization (MRO), underground organization of the Moro people in Mindanao, southern Philippines.
- (16) Revolutionary Organization of *Lumads*, revolutionary organization of indigenous peoples in southern Philippines.

³¹⁶ "What is the NDF?" from the internet: <http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/fil/ndf.html> (accessed 12/11/04)

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APPENDIX B: NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (NDF) TWELVE-POINT [POLITICAL] PROGRAM³¹⁷

- (1) Unite the people for the overthrow of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal system through a people's war and for the completion of the national democratic revolution.
- (2) Establish a people's democratic republic and a democratic coalition government.
- (3) Build the people's revolutionary army and the people's defense system.
- (4) Uphold and promote the people's democratic rights.
- (5) Terminate all unequal relations with the United States and other foreign entities.
- (6) Implement genuine agrarian reform, promote agricultural cooperation, raise rural production and employment through the modernization of agriculture and rural industrialization and ensure agricultural sustainability.
- (7) Break the combined dominance of the U.S. and other imperialists, big compradors and landlords over the economy. Carry out national industrialization and build an independent and self-reliant economy.
- (8) Adopt a comprehensive and progressive social policy.
- (9) Promote a national, scientific and pro-people culture.
- (10) Uphold the rights to self-determination and democracy of the Moro people, Cordillera peoples and other national minorities or indigenous peoples.
- (11) Advance the revolutionary emancipation of women in all spheres.
- (12) Adopt an active, independent and peaceful foreign policy.

³¹⁷ This version of the NDF political program was approved during the NDF First National Conference of July 1994. Source: "NDF Twelve-Point Program" from the internet:
<http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/fil/ndfprog.html> (accessed 12/11/04)

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